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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an introduction to the recent literature on macroeconomic stabilization in closed
and open economies. We present a stylized theoretical framework, and illustrate its main properties
with the help of an intuitive graphical apparatus. Among the issues we discuss: optimal monetary
policy and the welfare gains from macroeconomic stabilization; international transmission of real
and monetary shocks and the role of exchange rate pass-through; the design of optimal exchange rate
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The past decade has witnessed rapid and substantial developments in the literature on
macroeconomic stabilization in closed and open economies, with potentially far-reaching
implications for the design and conduct of monetary policy. Despite important di⁄erences
in emphasis and style, a number of tightly related research agendas (from the ￿ new neo-
classical￿synthesis to the ￿ neo-Wicksellian￿monetary economics to the ￿ new open-economy
macroeconomics￿ , and so on) have focused on the properties of choice-theoretic models with
imperfectly competitive labor and/or product markets and nominal rigidities. An explicit
attempt to provide a synthesis between elements from real business cycle models and short-
run ￿ Keynesian￿wage and/or price inertias is the minimum common denominator of the vast
array of ￿ Dynamic Stochastic General-Equilibrium￿models (in short, DSGE models) that
have recently been developed in academic research, and have found fertile grounds among
central banks and policy institutions.
This paper is meant to provide an introduction to these new research strands, deliberately
(but not exclusively) targeted toward a non-specialist audience. In fact, our objective is to
use a stylized theoretical framework to access the literature on policy stabilization and
macroeconomic transmission, and visualize some key results with the help of an intuitive
graphical apparatus. Without attempting to provide an exhaustive overview of the literature
(a task well beyond the scope of a ￿ simple geometry￿ ), an important goal of our exercise is
pedagogical: scholars, practitioners and policy analysts uninterested in unraveling technical
details may ￿nd in our graphs a useful tool to ￿ inspect the mechanism￿and convey important
results from more complex models in a transparent and immediate fashion.
Transparency and immediacy are achieved via restrictions on the speci￿cation of pref-
erences and technology, which allow us to maintain analytical tractability and focus on
the substance of the argument without sacri￿cing theoretical coherence.1 On the negative
side, parametric restrictions may well hamper the degree of generality and robustness of
the theoretical framework. Thus, when necessary, in the text we will comment on our key
assumptions, to make sure that the general principles conveyed by our analysis are not
confused with model-speci￿c results. Very few equations ￿ and only extremely intuitive
ones ￿ appear in the main text. Relatively advanced readers are referred to the Appendices
where full-￿ edged versions of the models described in the main text, with complete algebraic
details, are available.
This paper is organized as follows. The next three sections delve into building the main
analytical and graphical tools in a closed-economy setting, covering both normative and
positive issues. Section 2 describes the basic macroeconomic model. Section 3 analyzes the
transmission of monetary policy, characterizes macroeconomic stabilization and provides el-
ements for a welfare analysis. Section 4 discusses and extends the basic model, including a
brief analysis of ￿scal shocks. The following sections of the paper reconsider our conceptual
apparatus in the context of a two-country world model. Section 5 describes the global econ-
omy and introduces alternative price-setting regimes in the presence of market segmentation.
Section 6 revisits the traditional view about the stabilization properties of exchange rate
movements. Section 7 discusses the international dimensions of optimal monetary policy,
linking them to the choice of the exchange rate regime. Section 8 discusses a few extensions
1Among the advantages of our approach is the possibility of solving the model in closed form for a generic
distribution of stochastic fundamentals, thus paving the way to a straightforward graphical representation
of the equilibrium results.
1of the model and Section 9 concludes.
2 A basic macroeconomic model
We start by developing a stylized closed-economy macroeconomic model. The model is
fully speci￿ed in Appendix I, which also derives and characterizes the general-equilibrium
allocation.
The economy consists of households, ￿rms, and the government. There is no external
trade in goods or assets. The population size is normalized to one, so that we can use the
same notation for aggregate and per-capita variables.
Households have identical preferences. They derive utility from consuming the products
supplied by the ￿rms, and disutility from supplying labor to the ￿rms in exchange for wage
incomes. There may be other elements a⁄ecting households￿utility, for instance real money
balances, but in what follows we disregard them as quantitatively negligible. At any point
in time, utility U is equal to:
U = lnC ￿ ￿‘ (1)
where C is consumption and ‘ is hours worked. The parameter ￿ measures the discomfort









There are many varieties (or ￿ brands￿ ) of the consumption good. Each ￿rm produces a
single variety, which is an imperfect substitute to all other varieties. Labor is the only input
in production. Productivity (output per unit labor) is subject to economy-wide shocks. The
labor market is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
As ￿rms have market power over the supply of their products, they set prices as markups
over marginal costs. We allow for nominal price rigidities in the short run. For simplicity,
we assume that ￿rms preset the price of their own products at the beginning of each period,
and stand ready to meet current demand at this price during the period.
The government includes both the central bank in charge of monetary policy and the
￿scal authorities. In most of our analysis we abstract from public consumption, so that
￿scal policymakers only redistribute revenue across agents.2
2.1 The structure of the economy
Our model can be synthesized by means of three schedules, as illustrated in Figure 1:
Aggregate Demand [AD], Aggregate Supply [AS], and the Natural Rate [NR].3 Figure 1
plots labor e⁄ort ‘ on the horizontal axis and consumption C on the vertical axis.
Let P denote the consumer price index associated with the consumption basket C, that
is, an average of the prices of all consumption varieties. Without investment or government
spending, C coincides with aggregate demand in real terms, while PC is aggregate nominal
2We analyze government spending shocks in Section 4.4.
3Throughout the paper we maintain the Aggregate Demand / Aggregate Supply conceptual apparatus of
most macro textbooks, although our graphical approach is closer in spirit to the microeconomic treatment
of input/output relations. Thus, readers used to think about ￿ Aggregate Supply￿in reference to the relation
between the price level and output, or in￿ation and the output gap, may prefer to consider our AS schedule
as the consumption-employment relation implied by the technology of production.
2spending. Let ￿ denote a variable that synthesizes the e⁄ect of monetary policy (whatever
the speci￿c policy instruments used) on aggregate nominal spending PC. We can refer to
￿ as the aggregate monetary stance of the country.4 The Aggregate Demand ￿ AD￿equation
can then be written as:
C = ￿=P (3)
A monetary ease (higher ￿) provides nominal stimulus to the economy. With prices preset
in the short run, aggregate demand moves one-to-one with the policy stance. In terms of
Figure 1, the ￿ AD￿is a horizontal line: given the price level P, a higher monetary stance ￿
translates into higher real consumption C. By the same token, given the monetary stance
￿, consumption is higher the lower is the price level.
Next, let Z denote labor productivity. The Aggregate Supply ￿ AS￿equation relates
output (that in closed economy is equal to real domestic expenditure) to total employment
measured in terms of hours worked:
C = Z‘ (4)
Holding C constant, shocks to productivity Z lead to ￿ uctuations in aggregate employment
‘. In Figure 1, the ￿ AS￿schedule is a ray from the origin with slope determined by the
productivity parameter Z: higher productivity translates into a steeper line.
At any point in time, the intersection between ￿ AD￿and ￿ AS￿determines the equilibrium
allocation of consumption C and labor ‘ for given values of the exogenous variables ￿ and
Z, as well as for a given price level P. Of course, the price level is an endogenous variable
in our system. We therefore need to analyze how ￿rms optimally set their prices.
Consider ￿rst the case in which prices are perfectly ￿ exible and adjust in response to
supply and demand interactions in the product market. Imperfectly competitive ￿rms will
set prices by charging an optimal markup over their marginal costs. Labor is the only input
in production, so that marginal costs are labor costs per unit of product, i.e. the wage rate
(here denoted by W) divided by labor productivity Z. The markup charged by the ￿rm is
a function of its monopoly power in the product market, which, in itself, is a function of
the ￿rm variety￿ s substitutability relative to all other varieties. Let ￿ denote the elasticity
of substitution between di⁄erent varieties of the consumption good. We assume that ￿ is
su¢ ciently large ￿ to capture the idea that varieties of the same consumption good are good
substitutes for each other ￿ but not ￿too￿large (otherwise all varieties would substantially
be similar in the eye of the consumers, and a ￿rm would have no monopoly power at all in
setting the price of its product). Speci￿cally, we assume 1 < ￿ < 1.











Interpreting the expression above, if the elasticity of substitution ￿ were very high, prices
would be equal to marginal costs W=Z. But if ￿ were relatively small (close to one), ￿rms
would face very inelastic demand curves for their products, and would be able to exploit
their signi￿cant market power by charging very high prices relative to the production costs.
Moreover, with a perfectly competitive labor market, the equilibrium wage rate in units of
consumption (W=P) must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
4In Section 4.2 we consider some examples of policy instruments corresponding to a given stance ￿.
3and leisure of the representative agent (2).5 It follows that the nominal wage is proportional
to nominal spending:
W = ￿PC (6)













￿ ￿ ‘ (8)
Equation (8) de￿nes the ￿ natural￿or ￿ potential￿rate of employment, ￿ ‘, as the level of
employment that would prevail in an economy without nominal rigidities.6 The natural rate
depends on agents￿preferences about leisure, as captured by the parameter ￿: the lower is
￿, the higher is households￿supply of labor inputs to ￿rms in equilibrium. It also depends
on the monopolistic distortions in the economy: the higher is ￿, the lower is the equilibrium
markup, and the higher is the equilibrium level of employment. Observe that, while the
natural rate of employment is constant, the natural rate of output Z￿ ‘ (de￿ned as output in
an economy without nominal rigidities) will ￿ uctuate as a function of productivity shocks
Z.
In Figure 1, we plot equation (8) as the third schedule ￿ NR￿or ￿ Natural Rate￿ : a ver-
tical line above the constant ￿ ‘. In the ￿ ex-price equilibrium, the ￿ AD￿and ￿ AS￿schedules
cross each other corresponding to the natural rate of employment. Once C and ‘ are de-
termined at the intersection of ￿ AS￿and ￿ NR￿ , the price level P adjusts for any level of the
current monetary stance ￿ to make sure that ￿ AD￿intersects the other two schedules at the
equilibrium point.
Macroeconomic adjustment is quite di⁄erent with nominal price rigidities. In our setting,
prices are not ￿ exible in the short run. Rather, ￿rms preset their prices and are unable to
modify them once they observe the actual realizations of W and Z. Under these conditions,










Of course, when prices are preset, unanticipated changes in marginal costs can reduce or
raise the ex-post pro￿ts of the ￿rm.9
5If the labor market were imperfectly competitive, there would be a wedge (labor market markup)
between real wage and marginal rate of substitution, re￿ecting workers￿market power.
6This result can be generalized to the case of non-linear disutility of labor e⁄ort. Suppose for in-
stance that U = lnC ￿ ￿‘1+￿=(1 + ￿). In this case the natural rate of employment is a constant equal
to [(￿ ￿ 1)=￿￿]1=1+￿. For more general model speci￿cations, the natural rate need not be constant, and
consequently the graphical representation of the equilibrium allocation turns out to be less straightforward.
For a generalization of our graphical apparatus to the case in which the natural rate depends on consumption
see Corsetti and Pesenti (1997).
7As discussed in Appendix 1, product prices are optimally preset to maximize the discounted value of
the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts. While in general this problem is quite complex, it greatly simpli￿es in our setting.
8In what follows, E(X) will refer to the expected value of the variable X based on information available
at the time expectations are taken. With one-period nominal rigidities, the expression E(X) is shorthand
for Et￿1(Xt).
9The ex-post gross markup is P=(W=Z), or ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿1 E(W=Z)=(W=Z). As long as the shocks are not too
4We now show that, in a sticky-price environment, employment is equal to the natural
rate only in expected terms. To see this, recall that W = ￿PC and PC = ￿ from (6) and


















Rearranging and taking expectations, we obtain:










= ￿ ‘ (12)
On average, expected employment is equal to its natural rate. An intuitive interpretation
of (12) is that, in equilibrium, ￿rms choose prices so as to insure that, on average, they will
operate on their ￿ ex-price supply curve; we will return to this point in Section 4.10
To sum up: the ￿ Aggregate Demand￿equation (3) relates nominal spending to the mon-
etary policy stance. The ￿ Aggregate Supply￿equation (4) relates aggregate supply to em-
ployment. Prices in the short run are set such that, in expectation, the economy operates
along the ￿ Natural Rate￿equation (12). In the long run, when prices are ￿ exible, the ￿ NR￿
equation determines labor ‘, the ￿ AS￿equation determines consumption C given ‘ and Z,
and the ￿ AD￿equation (3) determines the price level P given C and ￿.
2.2 Welfare properties of the market allocation
With the help of our graphical apparatus, we now analyze the welfare implications of macro-
economic shocks and changes in structural parameters that shift the three schedules in Figure
1. Observe that, given the utility function (1), the indi⁄erence curves in the space (‘;C) are
convex and upward sloping, with slope proportional to consumption according to (2). In
Figure 1 the dashed curve is the indi⁄erence curve associated with the equilibrium. Utility
is increasing as we move upwards or westwards, corresponding to higher consumption levels
for any given labor e⁄ort, or lower labor e⁄ort for any given consumption level.
In the presence of monopolistic distortions in the product market, an economy operating
at the natural rate ￿ ‘ will not be Pareto e¢ cient:11 the equilibrium level of employment and
output will be suboptimally low, as ￿rms contract their supply of goods to exploit their
monopoly power and maximize their pro￿ts.
We can provide a simple graphical representation of this point. In Figure 1, the indi⁄er-
ence curve that goes through the equilibrium point crosses the ￿ AS￿locus from above. That
is, at the equilibrium C = Z￿ ‘, the marginal rate of substitution (measured by the slope of
large, ￿rms￿ex-post markups will remain above one. Note that in a model without monopolistic distortions
any increase in marginal cost would lower the ex-post markup below one, prompting ￿rms to adjust their
prices in response to the shock: in that framework, nominal rigidities would be inconsistent with the rational
behavior of ￿rms.
10In more complex models, expected employment need not be at the natural rate in any period. Never-
theless, optimal price setting is such that employment converges to the natural rate asymptotically.
11An allocation is Pareto e¢ cient if there is no other allocation in which some other individual is better
o⁄ and no individual is worse o⁄.
5the indi⁄erence curve of the representative household) is smaller than the marginal rate of














This illustrates a general and crucial feature of economies with monopolistic power in pro-
duction. Intuitively, due to monopolistic distortions, in equilibrium the disutility from a
marginal increase in labor e⁄ort is lower than the utility from higher revenue.
In the absence of monopolistic distortions, the equilibrium in the model would correspond
to a point in which the indi⁄erence curve is tangent to the ￿ AS￿locus. To see this, assume
that product varieties are highly substitutable, i.e. let ￿ become in￿nitely large, so that the
monopoly power of ￿rms is arbitrarily small. Expression (13) shows that in equilibrium the
slope of the indi⁄erence curve will be identical to the slope of the ￿ AS￿locus, and equal to
Z. Indeed, the Pareto-e¢ cient level of employment is 1=￿.
The previous point is illustrated in Figure 2. One can easily visualize the e⁄ect of
structural reforms reducing monopolistic distortions in the economy as a rightward shift of
the ￿ Natural Rate￿vertical locus. The equilibrium moves from point O to point X. As is
apparent from (12), ￿ ‘ is increasing in ￿, the elasticity of substitution across varieties that
is inversely related to the size of the equilibrium markup in the economy. For any given
productivity Z, a reduction in ￿rms￿market power raises output, and therefore consumption,
towards their Pareto-e¢ cient levels. For any given monetary stance ￿, the price level P falls.
3 Macroeconomic transmission and policy stabilization
in closed economy
In this section we use our apparatus to analyze the macroeconomic e⁄ects of productivity and
monetary shocks. We address these issues in two steps. We ￿rst study the macroeconomic
response to shocks when prices are ￿ exible. Next, we reconsider the same shocks in the
context of an economy with sticky prices, and compare the two equilibrium allocations.
Throughout the analysis, we focus on positive shocks, de￿ned as unexpected increases in
Z and ￿ (with the understanding that the analysis of negative shocks would be perfectly
symmetric).12
3.1 The equilibrium allocation under ￿ exible prices
Consider ￿rst the e⁄ects of a productivity boom when prices are fully ￿ exible, as in (7).
In this case, an increase in Z does not a⁄ect the equilibrium level of employment, which
remains constant at ￿ ‘. Instead, a shock to Z raises proportionally the equilibrium level of
output for a given ￿ ‘, generating excess supply in the economy. If nominal spending ￿ (and
the wage rate W) does not change, marginal costs fall re￿ ecting higher productivity. The
price level P then falls enough to boost consumption demand to the new level of output.
Figure 3 illustrates graphically the e⁄ect of the positive productivity shock just described.
Let O be the initial equilibrium allocation. An increase in Z tilts the ￿ AS￿locus upwards:
higher productivity raises the level of consumption that is sustainable for any given employ-
ment level. With employment at ￿ ‘ and no change in the monetary stance ￿, prices fall in
12A very preliminary list of references includes Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999, 2005), Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (2000), Gali (2002), Goodfriend and King (2001), Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003).
6response to the excess supply, shifting the ￿ AD￿locus upward. The new equilibrium, A in
the Figure, corresponds to higher consumption (measured by the segment OA) and lower
prices, while employment remains unchanged at its natural rate ￿ ‘.
The e⁄ects of monetary shocks (exogenous changes in ￿) are straightforward: under
￿ exible prices they have no e⁄ect on the equilibrium allocation. In fact, to the extent that
￿ and P move instantaneously in the same proportion, consumption and the ￿ AD￿locus in
Figure 3 remain unchanged.
3.2 Nominal price rigidities and the e⁄ectiveness of monetary pol-
icy
The equilibrium response to productivity shocks in an economy where prices are sticky in
the short run is quite di⁄erent from the ￿ exible-price case characterized above. If P cannot
adjust, aggregate demand is pinned down by monetary policy ￿; without a change in nominal
spending, consumption is constant in real terms during the period. Hence, ￿ uctuations in
productivity that are not matched by changes in aggregate demand necessarily translate into
changes in short-run employment and output. Relative to the natural rate of employment
and output, a positive productivity shock opens both an employment gap and an output
gap.
Figure 3 illustrates these points. Without price ￿ exibility, a productivity shock that
rotates the ￿ AS￿locus upwards does not translate into a fall in prices, and therefore is not
matched by a proportional upward movement of the ￿ AD￿locus. Unless ￿ is raised by
the monetary authorities, the new short-run equilibrium will correspond to the point B
in which the new ￿ AS￿locus crosses the (unchanged) ￿ AD￿locus. Employment falls below
￿ ‘ while output falls below Z￿ ‘. As shown in the Figure, a productivity shock opens an
employment gap OB, which in our economy is proportional to the output gap OA.13 Note
that the appropriate measure of output gap in our context is the di⁄erence between the
amount of resources that could be produced and consumed under ￿ exible prices, and the
analogous amount in the presence of nominal rigidities.
Monetary policy can be e⁄ective in this framework. Provided monetary authorities are
able to observe or predict Z with accuracy, and can use appropriate policy instruments to
control nominal spending, they can engineer a monetary expansion to raise ￿ and bring the
economy to operate exactly as if prices were ￿ exible. Figure 4 shows what happens when
policymakers use monetary instruments to raise ￿ in proportion with Z: the ￿ AD￿curve
shifts up by the amount OA and closes the employment and the output gaps. As a result,
the short-run in￿ exibility of prices does not prevent the economy from operating at the
natural rate.
Note that the monetary stance that brings employment and output to their natural
rates is expansionary when the economy experiences a productivity shock that opens nega-
tive employment and output gaps (by symmetry, it will be contractionary when an adverse
productivity shock leads to overheating of the economy at unchanged demand conditions).
Intuitively, the productivity boom makes an increased amount of resources potentially avail-
able for consumption. But if prices do not fall, consumers whose nominal incomes are un-
13With P ￿xed during the period, there is no short-run in￿ation (de￿ation) in response to positive (neg-
ative) output gaps. However, one could obtain some responsiveness of the ￿ AD￿schedule to productivity
shocks by allowing for an imperfect degree of short-run price ￿exibility ￿ without changing the message
from our results above. For instance, if prices could partially respond to excess supply, a fall in the price
level would somewhat raise the ￿ AD￿schedule, moving the equilibrium allocation closer to the natural rate.
7changed are unable to purchase these additional products. Hence the need for a monetary
stimulus, which generates additional aggregate demand and brings the economy back to
potential.
Needless to say, once we move beyond the boundaries of our stylized framework and
account for additional realistic elements, there are other possible policy trade-o⁄s that make
monetary policy less e⁄ective than suggested by the above analysis. Namely, monetary
policy will not target ￿ exactly￿the ￿ ex-price allocation in the presence of cost-push and
sectoral shocks, dual wage and price rigidities, investment dynamics etc. Yet, the main
principles established in this section remain largely valid.
3.3 Optimal monetary policy
To summarize, policymakers informed about the state of the economy Z could use monetary
instruments to move aggregate demand C toward its ￿ ex-price level for a given price level
P. Would such a policy conduct be optimal?
To address this question, we need to account for the endogenous response of optimal
prices to the expected behavior of the policymakers. So far, we have used our apparatus
to analyze the performance of the macroeconomy at given prices. Yet, as shown in (10)
above, prices are endogenous: forward-looking ￿rms set the prices of their products on
the basis of their expectations about both economic fundamentals and policy variables. In
what follows we analyze the implications of this price-setting process, and characterize the
￿ optimal￿monetary stance chosen by welfare-maximizing monetary authorities able to make
credible commitments.
To perform such an exercise, we need to specify a welfare metric: in our model, it is
natural to assume that the objective function of the policymakers, here denoted by W,
coincides with the expected utility of the national representative agent:
W = E (U) = E (lnC ￿ ￿‘) (14)
Now recall that in a market equilibrium expected employment is constant and equal to its
natural rate according to (12). Thus, using the equilibrium expression for optimal preset
prices (10), the welfare criterion simpli￿es to:
W = E (lnC) ￿ ￿￿ ‘ = E (ln￿) ￿ E (lnP) ￿ ￿￿ ‘













￿ = ￿Z (17)
where ￿ is an arbitrary positive parameter that ￿rms know when they set their prices.14
The previous condition characterizes the optimal monetary policy stance up to the scale
of nominal variables in the economy. The optimal policy consists of a commitment to provide
14In expression (17), ￿ need not be constant over time: it can represent any deterministic process that
￿rms are able to predict at the time they take their expectations.
8a nominal anchor for the economy, ￿, and to deviate from such stance only when produc-
tivity shocks in the economy threaten to destabilize marginal costs and move employment
and output away from their potential levels. In our framework, by responding fully and
systematically to Z, such policy completely eliminates uncertainty in marginal costs, and
thus in pro￿ts. Prices are stabilized at the level P = ￿￿￿=(￿ ￿ 1).
It is straightforward to restate the results above in terms of in￿ ation rates, rather than
price levels. Suppose that the monetary authorities set the nominal anchor according to:
￿ = P￿1 (1 + e ￿) (18)
where P￿1 is the lagged price level observed at the time expectations are taken, and e ￿
is the ￿ desired￿ rate of in￿ ation ￿ i.e. the (implicit or explicit) in￿ ation target of the
policymakers, which may be equal to zero. Given the above nominal anchor, in the absence
of shocks (Z = 1) ￿rms would optimally set their prices equal to ￿ in each period: the
economy would exhibit a constant in￿ ation rate equal to e ￿:
P
P￿1
= (1 + e ￿) (19)
But this is precisely the outcome that would prevail in the presence of shocks to Z, provided
that the monetary authorities implement (17). In the next subsection, we show that this is
not the case when the economy is subject to insu¢ cient stabilization.
If monetary authorities deliver the optimal monetary stance (17), nominal rigidities are
inconsequential, in the sense that policymakers can stimulate aggregate demand to close
the output gap and push the economy toward potential regardless of stickiness in price
adjustment. In terms of Figure 4, any stochastic rotation of the ￿ AS￿locus is perfectly
matched by a corresponding shift in the ￿ AD￿locus, so that in the short run the equilibrium
always lies along the ￿ NR￿vertical line above the natural rate. Note that, under optimal
monetary policy, consumption will not be constant but rather ￿ uctuate with productivity,
perfectly matching the ￿ exible-price allocation.
3.4 The costs of insu¢ cient stabilization: ine¢ ciently high markups
and low purchasing power
Having established what ￿ optimal policy￿means in the framework of our model, we can
now turn our attention to a di⁄erent issue: what are the consequences of adopting a sub-
optimal monetary policy not aimed at full stabilization? We will show that insu¢ cient
stabilization translates into suboptimally high markups and price levels ￿ making a case
for ￿ price stability￿in the design of optimal stabilization policies.
To provide a graphical treatment, without loss of generality consider an economy where
Z is a random variable that can rise or fall by the same amount with equal probability
1/2, with E (Z) = 1. Figure 5 depicts the two possible ￿ AS￿lines, corresponding to a high
and a low level of Z. They intersect the ￿ NR￿locus at points A and A0, respectively. For
convenience, we also draw the ￿ AS￿line corresponding to the average level of productivity
E(Z) = 1. The latter intersects the ￿ NR￿locus at point O, with AO = O0A. Observe that,
were the optimal policy (17) in place, employment would be constant at its natural level
￿ ‘, and consumption would be high or low depending on the realization of the productivity
shock.
We are interested in studying the equilibrium allocation when policymaking deviates
from the optimal monetary stance. For instance, suppose that monetary authorities set the
9current stance according to:
￿ = ￿Z￿ (20)
where ￿ is a constant parameter with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Clearly, ￿ = 1 corresponds to the optimal
policy response to shocks (17). For any value of ￿ di⁄erent from one, the monetary response
to shocks will be ine¢ cient. We also assume that monetary authorities set ￿ according to
(18) above.
To focus sharply on our main message, it is convenient to carry out our analysis under
the extreme assumption that ￿ does not respond at all to the output gap, i.e. ￿ = 0. With
sticky prices, consumption will then be constant but employment will be ￿ uctuating with Z:
it will be below the natural rate when the shock is positive, above the natural rate when the
shock is negative. These points are illustrated in Figure 5, where we include two ￿ AD￿lines,
drawn for di⁄erent price levels: the upper AD line is drawn for a price level PB, the lower
AD line for a higher price level PF > PB. The ￿ AD￿locus corresponding to PB intersects
the ￿ NR￿locus at point O, the ￿ AD￿locus corresponding to PF intersects the ￿ NR￿locus at
point Q that lies below O.
For a constant monetary stance ￿ = ￿, consumption is lower when prices are equal to
PF. For each level of P, the short-run equilibrium lies where the corresponding ￿ AD￿locus
crosses either the lower ￿ AS￿(if the shock is negative) or the higher ￿ AS￿(if the shock is
positive). When P = PB the economy operates either at B or at B0. When P = PF the
economy operates either at F or at F0.
What will the equilibrium level of P be? One may be tempted to conjecture that
uncertainty does not a⁄ect prices: ￿rms set prices equal to PB, as if the productivity level
were constant and equal to 1, i.e., the average of low and high productivity (recall in fact
that E(Z) = 1). The upper ￿ AD￿line in Figure 5 has been drawn precisely under such
assumption. Note that, corresponding to this ￿ AD￿line, aggregate consumption is equal to
the average of high and low consumption with ￿ exible prices.
Is this an equilibrium? One could easily show that this is not the case by considering
the pricing equation directly.15 There is however a more intuitive way to approach this
issue by using our graphical apparatus. Recall that ￿rms optimally preset prices to ensure
that, on average, they operate on their supply schedule. As discussed above, an important
implication of such behavior is that expected employment is equal to its natural rate. But
Figure 5 clearly suggests that this condition is violated when pricing is done in reference
to average productivity, i.e. when P = PB. In fact, consider the two possible equilibria
on the upper ￿ AD￿line. When the productivity shock is positive, employment falls by the
segment BO. But when the shock is negative, employment increases by a larger amount,
equal to the segment OB0 > BO. Taking the average of the two employment levels with
equal probability, it follows that at PB the expected employment gap will be positive, i.e.












since, with E (Z) = 1, E (1=Z) > 1. As a straigthforward implications of the Jensen￿ s inequality the optimal
price is above our candidate expression on the right hand side: the preset price level is increasing in the
variance of the productivity shock. An intuitive explanation of this result is the following. Uncertainty about
marginal costs tends to reduce expected discounted pro￿ts (these are a concave function of productivity).
However, by raising the preset price, a ￿rm can reduce the sensitivity of discounted pro￿t to shocks to
marginal costs.
10expected employment will be above the natural rate:
E(‘)jP=PB > ￿ ‘ (21)
In other words, at PB each ￿rm is supplying ￿too much￿relative to the level of output that
maximizes its expected discounted pro￿ts. Each ￿rm has therefore an incentive to cut back
on its production plans, raising its price: PB cannot be the equilibrium price level.
Given the distribution of Z, equilibrium pricing always equates the average gap between
employment and its natural rate to zero. In our example this principle has a simple geomet-
rical interpretation: given the two ￿ AS￿curves corresponding to the two di⁄erent realizations
of the productivity process, and holding ￿ constant, prices (and the ￿ AD￿schedule) must be
set such that the low and high employment allocations are perfectly symmetric around ￿ ‘. In
Figure 5, this happens in correspondence to the lower ￿ AD￿curve, based on the higher price
index PF. In this case, when the productivity shock is positive employment falls by the
segment FQ, and when the shock is negative employment increases by the segment QF0,
where FQ = QF0.16
Figure 5 sheds light on one of the key reasons why insu¢ cient stabilization can reduce
national welfare. Facing uncertainty in marginal costs, ￿rms raise their average markups
and charge higher prices for their products. As a result, households￿purchasing power is
suboptimally low: failure to stabilize the economy does not a⁄ect expected disutility from
labor e⁄ort (which is kept constant by ￿rms￿optimal pricing), but does reduce the expected
utility from consumption.17
By using the expression for optimal pricing, the equilibrium in￿ ation will be:
P
P￿1





> (1 + e ￿) (22)
The inequality sign follows as a straightforward implications of Jensen￿ s inequality. Higher
markups and prices imply that the realized in￿ ation rate will be higher than the targeted
rate of in￿ ation. Note that, since the growth of monetary stance is rebased in each period
relative to the price level realized in the previous period, monetary authorities de facto let ￿
grow at a rate equal to the realized rate of in￿ ation. Comparison of (19) with (22) highlights
the reason why macroeconomic stabilization and price stability can be thought of as two
faces of the same coin.
Observe that the above results can be easily generalized to economies where the deviation
from the optimal policy is ￿ smaller￿ , for some 0 < ￿ < 1 in (20). In this case monetary
authorities somewhat react to productivity shocks. Yet, to the extent that they fall short
16Observe that, in our speci￿cation, there is an important di⁄erence in the macroeconomic implications
of productivity uncertainty and noise in the conduct of monetary policy. Holding productivity constant,







Hence monetary noise in the form of i:i:d: shocks to ￿ do not alter expected marginal costs. In terms of our
graph, monetary noise translates into stochastic shifts of the ￿ AD￿curve, raising or lowering consumption
along the ￿ AS￿curve. But, di⁄erent from the case of productivity shocks, i:i:d: shifts of the ￿ AD￿curve do
not alter expected employment. This property does not hold for more general speci￿cations of preferences.
For instance, with a power utility in consumption, the level of prices will depend on monetary noise.
17In principle, one cannot rule out that for particular parameterizations of preferences and technology,
suboptimal stabilization policies put downward pressure on prices. However, the speci￿cations commonly
adopted by the literature yield results consistent with the one discussed in the text.
11of stabilizing marginal costs and output completely, average markups and prices remain
excessively and suboptimally high.
Furthermore, for any given suboptimal monetary policy, the higher the variance of the
shock (the further away are the two ￿ AS￿lines from each other in Figure 5), the higher the
equilibrium price level (thus, the lower the equilibrium ￿ AD￿ ). It follows that, for a given
monetary stance, changes in the variance of the shocks from one period to another lead to
adjustment in prices, creating temporary ￿ uctuations of in￿ ation.
4 The closed-economy model: discussion and exten-
sions
4.1 Time consistency and optimal policy
Consider once again Figure 2, depicting an equilibrium at point O where actual employment
is at its natural rate. From our discussion above, we know that this allocation would prevail
if the monetary authorities followed the policy rule (17). The problem with such allocation
is that monopoly distortions result in a socially suboptimal level of welfare: in equilibrium
the indi⁄erence curve cuts the ￿ AS￿curve from above. Once prices are set, ex-post utility
could be increased through a monetary expansion that moves the equilibrium to the right
of ￿ ‘, up to the point X at which the indi⁄erence curve is tangent to the ￿ AS￿locus. In other
words, the ￿ optimal￿monetary policy stance characterized above is not ￿ time consistent￿ .
To shed light on this point, consider what policymakers would do if they re-optimized
their monetary stance in a discretionary manner once prices have been set. De￿ne as
￿discretion the monetary stance that solves the problem:
max
￿
[ln￿ ￿ lnP ￿ ￿‘] (23)
Comparing (15) with the above expression, note that there is no expectation operator in
(23): the monetary authorities now take expectations and prices as given, independent of








according to which the optimal monetary policy under discretion pushes labor e⁄ort ‘ to-
wards its Pareto-e¢ cient level 1=￿, as discussed in Section 2.2.
There is however a crucial problem in solving for an equilibrium with discretionary











This condition cannot be part of a rational-expectations equilibrium. In fact, take expecta-
tions on both sides of (25): the two sides are equal only when ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) = 1, i.e. for ￿ ! 1.
Otherwise, whatever the price level chosen by the ￿rms, there is always an incentive for the
policymakers to expand monetary policy above private expectations.
To obtain a rational expectations equilibrium, the above model could be modi￿ed to
account for welfare costs from realized in￿ ation in (23).18 This would correspond to the tra-
18For instance, in Albanesi, Chari and Christiano (2003) in￿ation leads to a costly reduction in consump-
tion purchases because of the operation of the cash in advance constraint.
12ditional Kydland-Prescott/Barro-Gordon model of in￿ationary bias.19 Other contributions
in the literature analyze monetary policy in economies where distortionary (Pigouvian) tax
and subsidies can eliminate the distortions caused by monopoly power, hence making the
optimal policy time-consistent. Suppose that the government could subsidize ￿rms￿produc-
tion at the rate (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1, with ￿ = 1=￿, raising tax revenue in a lump-sum fashion. Then














Under these conditions, the monetary stance ￿ = ￿Z is both the optimal rule as de￿ned in
(17) and the optimal monetary policy under discretion ￿discretion as derived in (24). The
price level P is equal to ￿￿ and in equilibrium there is no longer an incentive for the
policymakers to deviate from the optimal stabilization policy. The economy operates at
an e¢ cient (￿rst-best) natural rate of employment, equal to 1=￿, such that the indi⁄erence
curve in our graph is tangent to the ￿ AS￿curve in equilibrium.
The intuition underlying this result is straightforward. There are two distortions in the
economy: nominal price rigidities and monopoly power in production. The government
needs at least two instruments to achieve e¢ ciency: on the demand side of the economy,
monetary policy eliminates the negative consequences of ￿xed prices; on the supply side
of the economy, ￿scal policy eliminates distortions due to monopolistic competition. The
appropriate monetary and ￿scal stance allows the policymakers to bring the economy to a
￿rst-best allocation.
4.2 Monetary policy and interest rates
So far we have characterized monetary policy in terms of an index of monetary stance ￿,
but have intentionally left unspeci￿ed the issue of how policymakers can control ￿. We now
provide some examples of policy instruments corresponding to a given stance ￿.
The most immediate case is one in which policymakers control money supply, while
private agents￿demand for real balances is proportional to consumption. In other words,
the stock of money supply is set by the government at some level M, while aggregate money
demand is equal to ￿PC, where ￿ is a positive constant.20 Now, by de￿ning ￿ = M=￿,
equilibrium in the money market takes the form of the ￿ AD￿schedule (3). In this case, ￿ is
simply proportional to the money stock: a monetary expansion leads to a one-to-one change
in nominal spending.
What if the monetary authorities do not control monetary aggregates but rather set
short-term nominal interest rates? Referring the reader to Appendix 1 for details, when










In terms of our notation, this equation introduces two new terms. The parameter ￿ is the
discount factor of the representative household: the lower is ￿, the higher the household￿ s
19See the original articles Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a,b).
20Appendix 1 shows how this equation could be derived in terms of a straightforward optimization problem
with logarithmic utility of consumption, as in expression (1), and real balances providing utility also in
logarithmic form.
13impatience to consume. The term 1=￿ can then be thought of as the ￿ natural￿real interest
rate in the economy. The term 1 + i is the gross return on a nominal bond denominated
in domestic currency, assumed to be directly controlled by the government. The optimality
condition (27) is a standard Euler equation. On the left hand side we have the marginal
utility of nominal wealth today. This has to be equal to the expected marginal utility of
nominal wealth tomorrow (the term under expectations), adjusted to account for deviations
of the current nominal interest rate 1 + i from the ￿ natural￿real rate of interest 1=￿.
Using our de￿nition ￿ = PC, we can use (27) to derive the nominal interest rate corre-
sponding to the implementation of monetary policies ￿ = ￿Z￿. We obtain:










The nominal interest depends on three elements: the ￿ natural￿real interest rate, 1=￿; the
evolution of the nominal anchor ￿+1=￿, re￿ ecting the policy response to current and ex-
pected in￿ ation or de￿ ation; and the policy response to productivity shocks, both current
and anticipated. The ￿rst element is exogenously given, independent of policymakers￿deci-
sions. The last element has been characterized in our analysis above: the nominal interest
rate falls when Z increases above its average, opening an output gap.21 This translates into
a lower real interest rate, raising consumption demand in the short run.22
Regarding the evolution of ￿, interest rate policy has to be chosen to rule out self-
validating increases in in￿ ation, and to guarantee a unique stationary rational expectations
equilibrium. In other words, it is necessary that P+1=P converges to the in￿ ation target
1 + e ￿ regardless of the current, observed level of in￿ ation. When in￿ ation grows above
target, monetary authorities must react by raising nominal rates in the current period, and
in all the future period until the price level has completely converged to the nominal anchor
￿ counteracting the e⁄ect of expected in￿ ation on current demand. This is the essence of
the ￿ Taylor principle￿ .23 The economy will then approach a steady state such that:
1 + i =
1 + e ￿
￿
(29)
4.3 In￿ ation variability and the Phillips curve
In the previous sections we have proceeded under the extreme assumption that no price
adjustment is possible in the short run. However, we could revisit our analysis by allowing
some partial adjustment of short run-prices towards their equilibrium levels. In doing so,
we would derive a Phillips curve ￿ that is, a positive relation between the output gap and
current in￿ ation.
Suppose that ￿rms enter the period with a given price, but now this price can be modi￿ed
after observing the realization of the shocks. Adjusting prices, however, entails costs that
are increasing in the size of the adjustment. In this case each ￿rm would choose to adjust its
21If the model allowed for productivity growth, the analysis would remain subtantially similar once the
natural real interest rate is appropriately adjusted for the underlying trend.
22If the in￿ation target and the associated path for a+1=￿ were too low, the fact that the nominal interest
rate cannot be negative (a zero lower bound on the interest rate i > 0) may complicate the implementation
of optimal stabilization policy. See Clouse, Henderson, Orphanides, Small and Tinsley (2000), Krugman
(1998), and Svensson (2003).
23See Taylor (1993) and Woodford (2001).
14price only partially. For simplicity, we can initially discuss the case in which the adjustment
is symmetric across all ￿rms. This slight modi￿cation of our setup enables us to discuss a
few important results.
First, provided that the monetary authorities implement the optimal policy stance ￿ =
￿Z, there will be no price adjustment in equilibrium. As shown above, the optimal monetary
policy reacts to shocks by stabilizing marginal costs completely. But with constant marginal
costs, there is no incentive for ￿rms to change prices in the short run. We have seen above
that optimal monetary policies make nominal rigidities irrelevant in equilibrium: the other
side of the coin is that price ￿ exibility is irrelevant too. At an optimum, the in￿ ation rate will
be constant, and equal to the desired in￿ ation rate e ￿. There will be no in￿ ation variability.
A second result is that insu¢ cient stabilization will induce some short-run variability
of in￿ ation rates. Suppose in fact that monetary authorities deviate from the optimal rule
(17), so that marginal costs are not completely stabilized. Facing unexpected ￿ uctuations
in their production costs, ￿rms now have an incentive to modify their prices. Consider the
case of a productivity slowdown (a fall in Z) that raises marginal costs. If prices do not
adjust at all, we are back to the case discussed in Section 3, with large positive employment
and output gaps. If prices adjust fully, the economy operates at potential and in￿ ation rises
above trend. In the intermediate case of partial price adjustment, the higher is the deviation
of employment from the ￿ natural￿rate, the higher is the pressure on prices to increase. The
opposite will be true when marginal costs are low. From this vantage point, with partial
adjustment of prices, our model generates a Phillips curve.24 Hence, productivity shocks
that are not completely o⁄set by monetary policymakers open output gaps. The latter are
associated with ￿ uctuations of in￿ ation, above and below trend. In addition to raising the
average markups, imperfect stabilization also raises the variability of in￿ ation.
We have seen above that suboptimally high average markups are a component of the
welfare costs of insu¢ cient stabilization ￿ leading to deviations of employment and con-
sumption from their benchmark levels under price ￿ exibility. However, there are other
welfare components related to in￿ ation variability. To the extent that the process of price
adjustment requires real resources and absorbs labor inputs that would otherwise be em-
ployed in the production sector, in￿ ation variability per se raises the average disutility of
labor for any level of consumption. Most importantly, when price adjustment is asymmetric
across ￿rms, goods that are symmetric in preferences and technology ￿ i.e., should have the
same price in equilibrium ￿ will have di⁄erent prices in response to a shock. In this case,
the dispersion of in￿ ation rates in the economy will induce distortions in relative prices,
reducing welfare.25
Throughout our exercise, we have considered economies where optimally designed sta-
bilization policies can eliminate distortions associated with nominal rigidities. However,
it is worth reiterating that this is generally not the case, as policymakers usually do not
have enough instruments to reach their objectives, and therefore face policy trade-o⁄s. For
instance, among the examples most frequently discussed in the literature, cost-push in￿ a-
tion may prevent monetary policies from supporting e¢ cient allocation with complete price
stability.
24It is easy to verify that a positive exogenous monetary shocks will raise employment above its natural
rate, inducing a temporary increase in in￿ation.
25Many contributions in the literature introduce nominal rigidities allowing for staggered price adjustment.
In the popular model of Calvo adjustment ￿ after Calvo (1983) ￿ price dispersion and in￿ation dynamics
are directly linked.
154.4 Fiscal shocks
To conclude the presentation of the closed-economy model, we consider two modi￿cations
of our baseline setup. First, we modify the speci￿cation of the utility function (1) and pose:




To the extent that ￿ is positive, the marginal disutility of labor e⁄ort is no longer a constant.
The key implication of this modi￿cation is that an increase in labor e⁄ort is now associated
with an increase in the real wage (and marginal cost). In fact, the wage equation (6) is now:
W = ￿PC‘￿ (31)
Second, we introduce public demand in the model and consider the macroeconomic
e⁄ects of government purchases of goods ￿nanced with lump-sum taxes.26 In what follows,





How does our graphical apparatus change under the new assumptions? In the presence
of government spending, the ￿ AS￿equation (4) becomes:
C (1 + g) = Z‘ (33)
An increase in government spending tilts the ￿ AS￿locus downward (similar to a negative
productivity shock): for any given level of private consumption, agents need to work more
to accommodate both private and public demand. There is no e⁄ect on the ￿ AD￿locus,
according to which only private nominal spending PC is a⁄ected by the monetary stance
￿. In light of the previous section, this point is straightforward when the instrument of
monetary policy is the nominal interest rate (in fact, equation (27) holds regardless of
the presence of government spending).27 Finally, both modi￿cations of the baseline model
a⁄ect the natural rate ￿ NR￿locus. In fact, it is possible to show that under ￿ exible prices
the natural rate is:
‘flex = ￿ ‘
1
1+￿ (1 + g)
1
1+￿ (34)
where ￿ ‘ is the same constant de￿ned in (8).28
Figure 6 illustrates the e⁄ects of an unanticipated permanent ￿scal expansion. The
economy starts o⁄ at point O. In the short run, the increase in g tilts the ￿ AS￿locus
downward. Since short-run prices are predetermined and (by assumption) there is no change
26Public spending can be assumed to be purely dissipative, with no impact on households￿utility. Alter-
natively, it can be assumed that government spending enters households￿utility in an additively separable
way, so that an increase in public spending has no e⁄ect on the marginal utility of consumption or the
marginal disutility of labor e⁄ort.
27Aggregate money demand may be a function of both private and public consumption. Under this
assumption the ￿ AD￿locus could still be independent of government spending, provided that ￿scal expansions
are accommodated by monetary policy.
28As the natural rate is now a stochastic function of ￿scal shocks g, E(‘) can no longer be equal to the
natural rate. In fact, one can show that:
E(‘) = ￿ ‘
1




E (1 + g)1+￿
i￿ 1
1+￿
16in the monetary stance, consumption does not change either. Instead, the economy moves
along the ￿ AD￿locus, and employment increases in tandem with government spending by an
amount OA.29 In the long run, real wages and marginal costs adjust upward to re￿ ect the
permanent increase in demand for goods. As a result, output increases by less than public
spending, so that the supply of goods available for private consumption goods falls while
prices increase.
In Figure 6, the higher real wages shift the ￿ NR￿locus to the right: for any level of
consumption, agents are now willing to supply more labor. At the same time, prices P
increase for any level of the monetary stance ￿, so that the ￿ AD￿locus shifts downward. Thus,
the economy reaches an equilibrium such as point B, corresponding to lower consumption
and higher output levels relative to the initial allocation (point O): higher public spending
crowds out private spending and generates in￿ ation. In welfare terms the new allocation is
Pareto inferior to the previous equilibrium, unless there are direct utility gains from higher
public consumption.
5 Exchange rates and prices in open economy: more
building blocks
We now extend our analysis to the study of interdependent, open economies. Relative to
the closed-economy model analyzed above, there are at least two new important features to
consider.
First, ￿rms sell now in two markets, both domestically and abroad. Modelling nominal
rigidities thus raises important issues about ￿rms￿pricing behavior. Are product prices
preset in the domestic currency only? Or, rather, do ￿rms ￿x two sets of prices, one for the
domestic market and the other for the export market (provided that product markets are
su¢ ciently segmented so that agents cannot arbitrage price di⁄erentials)?
A second di⁄erence is that, in addition to the macroeconomic distortions associated with
nominal rigidities and monopoly power in production, there is now a new distortion related
to a country￿ s monopoly power on its terms of trade, that is, the relative price of foreign
traded goods in terms of domestic traded goods. In fact, ￿rms ignore the impact of their
pricing and production decisions on the country￿ s overall terms of trade. A decentralized
equilibrium re￿ ects this ine¢ ciency, adding a further dimension to the policy problem.
In what follows we build a two-country general-equilibrium theoretical framework. Our
graphical apparatus in the two-country case is to a large extent similar to the one developed
for closed-economy analysis. However, because of a number of features speci￿c to interde-
pendent economies, we will modify the interpretation of several variables, and reconsider
our results about the design of e¢ cient stabilization policies.
5.1 Extending the basic model to the world economy
The world economy consists of two countries of equal size, Home and Foreign, each producing
a country-speci￿c type of good that is traded worldwide.30 Countries and types of goods
are denoted by the same letter, H and F, respectively. Similar to the closed-economy
29Notice that the output multiplier of a government expansion is 1. To obtain ￿ Keynesian￿￿scal multipliers
above one the model needs to be modi￿ed e.g. to allow for non-optimizing agents, or overlapping generations
of households.
30For a multi-country extension of the model see Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini and Tille (2000).
17case, in each country monopolistic competitors produce imperfectly substitutable varieties
of the same national good, employing a linear technology with labor as the only input in
production.
Households consume both national and foreign goods. In both countries the elasticity
of substitution between di⁄erent varieties of the same type of goods (￿) is higher than the
elasticity of substitution between types of goods H and F, that we posit equal to one.31
In each country there is a country-speci￿c productivity shock. To the extent that macro-
economic shocks are not perfectly correlated across countries, national residents in the two
countries bene￿t from having access to some kind of risk-sharing mechanism. For simplicity,
and to minimize analytical di⁄erences with respect to the closed-economy case, we proceed
by positing from the start that assets markets are complete, so that agents can achieve full
consumption risk-sharing through a system of transfers contingent to the realization of the
shocks.32
In terms of notation, we adopt the convention that prices denominated in Foreign cur-
rency as well as quantities chosen by Foreign ￿rms and households are denoted with a star.
So, the Home and Foreign consumer price indexes are denoted by P and P￿ respectively,
employment levels by ‘ and ‘￿, aggregate consumption levels by C and C￿. Home consump-
tion C is a symmetric basket of the two country-speci￿c goods: CH is Home consumption of
the Home good, and CF is Home consumption of the Foreign good. By the same token, C￿
F
is Foreign consumption of local varieties and C￿
H denotes Foreign imports from the Home
country. The prices of the two goods are PH and PF in the Home countries, and P￿
H, and
P￿
F in the Foreign country. The nominal exchange rate is E, de￿ned as Home currency per
unit of Foreign currency ￿ so that an increase in E represents a depreciation of the Home
currency. The two country-speci￿c productivity shocks are Z and Z￿. Finally, we denote
the country-speci￿c monetary stances with ￿ and ￿￿.
A synthesis of the model (except the equations determining prices) is given in Table
1. It is also illustrated in Figure 7, with the Home country on the left and the Foreign
country on the right. As for the closed-economy case, the monetary stance in each country
synthesizes the e⁄ect of monetary policy on nominal spending. Hence the ￿ AD￿schedule
(￿rst row of Table 1) is formally identical to the ￿ AD￿in the previous sections. However,
private spending on consumption now falls on both Home and Foreign goods. As shown
by the second and third rows in Table 1, nominal spending on consumption is equally
divided between domestically produced goods and imports, consistent with the assumption
of symmetric consumption baskets. Hence, relative to the closed economy case, the domestic
price level is an equally-weighted index of domestic and import prices (fourth row of Table
1).33
The ￿ AS￿schedule (￿fth row of Table 1) is also di⁄erent from the closed-economy case,
since it now translates the supply of domestic goods into the consumption of both domestic
31See Tille (2001) for a theoretical extension of this setup and Bergin (2003) for an empirical assessment
of similar models.
32Appendix II however discusses an important property of our model: if the initial net wealth is equal to
zero in both countries, our results below are independent of the asset market structure.
33For this reason, nominal price rigidities do not necessarily rule out endogenous ￿uctuations in the
consumer price indexes P and P￿, which may re￿ect movements in import prices in response to appreciation
or depreciation of the currency. For instance, given ￿, an increase in E may raise the Foreign good price in
domestic currency, thus reducing Home aggregate demand. However, such ￿ imported in￿ation￿would a⁄ect
not only the level, but also the composition of consumer demand. In fact, Home consumption would switch
in favor of the now cheaper domestic good.
18Table 1: The open-economy model
Home country Foreign country
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and imported goods. The Home (Foreign) ￿ AS￿schedule includes the new term ￿ (￿￿),
de￿ned in the sixth row of Table 1. To understand this term, observe that at current prices
it takes 1=￿ units of Home output to buy one unit of the Home consumption basket C (a
symmetric de￿nition applies to the Foreign economy).
Clearly, the price of consumption in terms of output is a function of the terms of trade
between the two countries, customarily de￿ned as the price of imports in terms of the price
of exports, or PF/(EP￿
H). For instance, a lower international price for the Home good
(an increase in PF=(EP￿
H)) worsens the Home terms of trade and reduces ￿, causing a
downward rotation of the ￿ AS￿schedule. For any level of Home consumption, Home output
and employment must now rise. So, in an open-economy context the ￿ AS￿can tilt downward
either because of negative productivity shocks (which are exogenous), or because of relative
price movements worsening the terms of trade (which are endogenous).
Finally, in our economy the nominal exchange rate only depends on the relative monetary
stance (last row of Table 1). This result is a direct consequence of complete markets, as
with full risk-sharing the ratio of the marginal utilities of Home and Foreign consumption
in any state of nature must be proportional to the relative price of consumption (i.e. the














so that, accounting for the ￿ AD￿equations, E = ￿=￿￿.35
As in the closed-economy model, in the absence of nominal rigidities ￿rms charge an
optimal ￿xed markup over marginal costs. It is straightforward to show that with linear
technologies and constant-elasticity demand functions, there is no incentive for a ￿rm to
































Once again, the natural employment rates in both countries can be easily calculated using
these expressions together with the ￿ AD￿and ￿ AS￿equations.
5.2 Nominal rigidities and the pricing of exports
To sum up: the ￿ AS￿ is a line through the origin. Its slope includes a term re￿ ecting
movements in the terms of trade of a country. The natural rate locus is identical in both
the closed- and open-economy versions of our model ￿ a property that will be very useful
in carrying out comparative analysis of our results. The ￿ AD￿is formally identical to the
closed-economy case ￿ it draws a horizontal line in the (‘;C) or (‘￿;C￿) space depicted
in Figure 7. However, in a closed economy, one-period nominal rigidities imply that the
consumer price index is ￿xed in the short run. This may not be necessarily the case in
an economy open to international trade: the price level may now adjust in the short run
￿ despite nominal rigidities ￿ per e⁄ect of ￿ uctuations in import prices driven by the
exchange rate.
The recent literature has revived an important debate about the empirical evidence on
the response of prices to exchange rate movements, providing di⁄erent possible approaches
to model nominal rigidities in an open economy. Empirically, we have a limited knowledge
of the elasticity of exchange rate pass-through onto import (export) prices. What we know
is that it is on average below 1, that it varies across sectors and countries, and is di⁄erent for
consumer goods and wholesale prices.36 Considered as a decision variable of the exporter,
the determinants of exchange rate pass-through may clearly include some of the variables
34The constant of proportionality depends on structural parameters such as asymmetric degrees of open-
ness. In our model it is equal to 1.
35With complete markets, the current account is implicitly de￿ned as the change in net asset positions
required to achieve the allocation (35). Therefore, in the solution of the model there is no need to add the
current account equation explicitly.
36See the discussion in Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(2000). Campa and Goldberg
(2002) provide updated estimates of exchange rate pass-through across countries.
20considered in our model ￿ such as the volatility of monetary and real shocks, as suggested
by Taylor (2000) and analyzed by Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) in the context of optimal
monetary rules, and by Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004) in non-optimizing models.
But it may reasonably depend on many other factors outside the scope of our contribution
￿ such as the exporter-importer working relationship stressed in the relationship-marketing
literature, the presence of distribution costs as in Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and Laxton
and Pesenti (2003), the size of the market share as in Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2005),
or the availability of ￿nancial strategies to limit exposure of exporters￿pro￿ts to exchange
rate ￿ uctuations as in Friberg (1998).
In this paper, however, we mainly link the degree of pass-through to the invoice currency
in the presence of nominal rigidities. We will discuss three possible speci￿cations of export
prices consistent with such an approach ￿ we assess policy implications in more general
models in Section 8.2. below.
￿ Producer Currency Pricing￿(PCP) In a ￿rst class of models, ￿rms preset prices in
their own currency and let prices abroad move one-to-one with the exchange rate.37 Since
export prices are set in the producer￿ s currency, the literature often refers to this case as























Observe that there is one-to-one pass-through of exchange rate movements onto the price
of imports, at both the border and the consumer-price level. Hence, once measured in the
same currency, goods prices are identical in all markets and the ￿ law of one price￿holds.
Under PCP, the terms of trade PF=EP￿
H are equal to P￿
FE=PH. Since PH and P￿
F in
(39) and (40) are preset, the Home terms of trade worsen with a nominal depreciation of
the Home currency (i.e. a higher E). The same nominal depreciation of the Home currency
will instead appreciate the Foreign terms of trade. Thus, when the Home currency weakens,
Home goods are cheaper relative to Foreign goods in both the Home and the Foreign country.
As demand shifts in favor of the goods with the lowest relative price, world consumption of
Home goods increases relative to consumption of Foreign goods. These are referred to as
￿ expenditure switching￿e⁄ects of exchange rate movements.
￿ Local currency pricing￿(LCP) According to a second class of models, ￿rms preset a
price in domestic currency for the domestic market, and a price in foreign currency for the
export markets.38 Since export prices are preset in the consumers￿currency, the literature



































37See e.g. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995, 1996 ch.10) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).
38See e.g. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), Betts and Devereux (2000), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2002), and Duarte and Stockman (2005).
21Exchange rate pass-through onto import prices is zero both at the border- and the consumer-
price level. The law of one price is violated with any unanticipated ￿ uctuation of the
exchange rate: unless the exchange rate is ￿xed or perfectly forecastable, the consumer
price of the Home good in domestic currency PH will be di⁄erent from its export price
in Home currency EP￿
H. Analogously, the consumer price of the Foreign good in Foreign
currency P￿
F will be di⁄erent from its export price in Foreign currency PF=E.39
Observe that, with P￿
H and PF predetermined and therefore ￿xed in the short run, a
nominal depreciation of the Home currency improves the Home terms of trade PF=EP￿
H.
Correspondingly, the Foreign terms of trade worsen. The e⁄ects of currency movements on
the terms of trade go in the opposite direction relative to the PCP case. Since prices are
preset in local currency, exchange rate ￿ uctuations do not a⁄ect the relative price faced
by importers and consumers. There is no ￿ expenditure switching￿e⁄ect of exchange rate
movements.
￿ Dollar pricing￿(DP) While the literature has mainly focused on the previous two polar
cases, there is also a third possibility (probably the most relevant one from an empirical
viewpoint): the world export prices are set in one ￿ vehicle￿currency only, say, in the Home
country￿ s currency. Home ￿rms preset all prices in their own currency; Foreign ￿rms preset





























In the DP case the law of one price only holds for the Home country products. Exchange
rate pass-through is asymmetric: it is zero in the Home country, but complete in the Foreign
country. Thus, a Home depreciation does not a⁄ect the price of imports in the Home country,
but lowers the price of imports in the Foreign country. Interestingly, however, the bene￿ts
of lower prices and higher purchasing power for the Foreign country consumers are o⁄set by
the pro￿t losses of Foreign ￿rms and shareholders. In fact, Foreign ￿rms that export to the
Home country sell their products at the price PF ￿ which is ￿xed in the short run ￿ but
repatriate their export sales revenue at the rate 1=E ￿ which falls with the Home currency
depreciation.
Export pricing and the natural rate We conclude this section by noting an important
property of the model. Independent of which pricing speci￿cation is selected among the
three possibilities described above, expected employment is always equal to its natural rate
￿ exactly as in the closed economy. As a straightforward implication of the equations
presented above, we have in fact:




for any characterization of the nominal rigidities in the export markets.
39It is worth restating that, for these di⁄erences to be a feature of a market equilibrium, one needs to
assume that no agent in the economy can take advantage of arbitrage opportunities in the goods markets.
40A similar framework is considered in Devereux, Engel and Tille (2003).
226 Macroeconomic transmission and policy stabilization
in open economy
In this section we study the international transmission of country-speci￿c productivity
shocks. Similar to the closed-economy case, we start by considering the allocation with
￿ exible prices, which provides a benchmark to guide our policy analysis below. Next, we
study the equilibrium allocation when policymakers react to shocks by pursuing policies
that stabilize output and employment at their natural rate ￿ the policy conduct that we
found ￿ optimal￿in a closed-economy context. We conclude by discussing whether and to
what extent optimal rules in open economy deviate from their closed-economy counterparts.
6.1 The equilibrium allocation under ￿ exible prices revisited
Figure 8 illustrates the macroeconomic response to a positive productivity shock in the
Home country, assuming that prices are perfectly ￿ exible. On impact, a positive shock to
Z rotates the ￿ AS￿schedule upward. We have seen that the natural rate of employment is
independent of productivity shocks. Hence, in an equilibrium without price rigidities higher
productivity raises consumption along the ￿ NR￿locus. Di⁄erent from the closed economy
case, however, the higher supply of Home goods lowers their international price: the terms
of trade move against the Home country.41
The fall in ￿, that re￿ ects worsening terms of trade, tilts the ￿ AS￿schedule downward,
partially o⁄setting the upward rotation of the ￿ AS￿due to a positive Z shock. In other
words, relative to the closed-economy case, a shock to Z makes the ￿ AS￿rotate by less.
For any given Home monetary stance ￿, the Home CPI P falls, although by less than the
domestic price of Home goods PH. Hence the ￿ AD￿shifts upwards, but not as far as it would
in a closed economy. The equilibrium moves from point O to point A.
Part of the gains from higher productivity in the Home country accrue to consumers
abroad. The fall in the international price of Home goods raises Foreign incomes in real
terms. Because of lower import prices, the Foreign terms of trade are stronger, raising
￿￿: the ￿ AS*￿rotates upward. Lower import prices also lower the Foreign CPI P￿, raising
consumption demand along with the ￿ AD*￿schedule. The equilibrium in the Foreign country
moves from point O￿ to point A￿. Overall, Foreign consumption increases while employment
remains at its natural level. This is an unambiguous welfare gain for the Foreign economy.
The international transmission of productivity shocks is clearly positive.
Similarly, we can use our graph to analyze the international implications of structural
policies that reduce the degree of monopoly power asymmetrically in the Home country.
In Figure 9, lower distortions in the Home economy raise the natural rate of employment
domestically. For a given productivity, a higher supply of Home goods leads to a drop in the
equilibrium terms of trade of the Home country: the ￿ AS￿is now less steep. Moving from
point O to point A, Home households consume and work more, as in the closed economy
case.42 But some of the bene￿ts of the reform leak abroad: better terms of trade for the
41A new generation of models are revisiting the implications of productivity shocks on the terms of trade
when accounting for creation and trade of new product varieties. The analysis of this section only focuses
on the ￿ intensive￿margin of trade, that is the international performance of sectors producing a given set
of varieties, without studying the ￿ extensive￿margin associated with new traded products. See Bergin and
Glick (2003), Ghironi and Melitz (2004), and Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2005).
42Observe however that worsening terms of trade reduce the Home bene￿t from the reform, relative to
the closed economy case.
23Foreign country (an upward shift in ￿ AS*￿ ) enable Foreign households to consume more at
an unchanged natural rate of employment: the Foreign equilibrium moves from O￿ to A￿,
with a net welfare gain. This is an example of (long-run) positive spillovers from structural
reforms or supply-side policies that are e⁄ective in reducing monopolistic distortions.43
6.2 Productivity shocks in open economies with nominal rigidities
As in the closed-economy model, with nominal rigidities the macroeconomic impact of
country-speci￿c productivity shocks is sharply di⁄erent. An unexpected increase in Home
productivity does not move the nominal exchange rate, which only responds to monetary
factors. Hence the shock has no impact on import prices, which are either sticky (as in LCP
case) or move with the exchange rate (as in the PCP case). With no changes in prices and
the CPI, aggregate demand is constant in real terms in both countries. Higher domestic
productivity at Home therefore translates into a lower level of domestic employment ￿
precisely as in the closed-economy case. Without changes in the exchange rate, there are
no consequences for the Foreign economy.
The previous point can be restated in graphical terms (see Figure 10): other things
equal, a positive shock to Home productivity rotates the ￿ AS￿upward and opens an em-
ployment/output gap. The equilibrium moves from point O to point B. Consumption is
not a⁄ected, economic activity is too low ￿ exactly as in Figure 3. The Foreign economy
remains completely unchanged at point O￿.
Note that this result holds regardless of the speci￿cation of nominal rigidities in the
export markets (i.e. PCP or LCP or DP). In all cases, productivity shocks have no direct
e⁄ect on prices and exchange rates. But as for the closed economy, shocks that translate
into undesirable employment ￿ uctuations, and open employment and output gaps, invite a
monetary policy response. Thus, productivity shocks may have an indirect e⁄ects on prices,
via changes in the monetary stance aimed at stabilizing the macroeconomy.
6.3 Stabilization properties of the exchange rate (the PCP model)
In our analysis of the closed economy we have seen that, when monetary authorities react to
productivity shocks by closing the output gap completely, the market equilibrium coincides
with the ￿ ex-price allocation. Is monetary policy equally e⁄ective in our open-economy
setting? To answer this question we need to focus on the role of exchange rate movements
in the international transmission.
The conventional wisdom exempli￿ed by the enduring contributions of Friedman (1953)
and Mundell (1963) suggests that, in a world with nominal price rigidities, exchange rate
movements facilitate the e¢ cient adjustment of international relative prices. With ￿ exible
prices, the relative price of Home goods falls in response to a positive productivity shock.
With sticky prices, adjustment can be achieved via an exchange rate depreciation (corre-
sponding to Home monetary expansion relative to Foreign), that lowers the international
price of the Home goods relative to Foreign goods.
To revisit the theoretical foundations of the conventional wisdom, we now consider our
open-economy model with PCP (the ￿rst of the three export pricing speci￿cations discussed
above): Home (Foreign) ￿rms preset their prices in domestic currency and let the Foreign-
(Home-) currency export price ￿ uctuate with the nominal exchange rate. We focus on the
43See Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004) for an application of this analysis to the net bene￿ts of
structural reforms in the euro area and their spillovers to the trading partners.
24following scenario. There is an unexpected, positive increase in productivity in the Home
country. Home monetary policymakers are assumed to adopt an ￿ inward-looking￿policy
rule, and set the monetary stance to stabilize the domestic markup and close the output gap
opened by productivity ￿ uctuations. Foreign monetary policymakers maintain a constant
monetary stance. This scenario provides a useful baseline for our analysis of the international
transmission mechanism. Note that we have said nothing about the optimality of the policy
responses described above: in this and the next two sections we take these monetary rules as
given and analyze their macroeconomic properties. Later, we discuss whether these policies
can be rationalized as welfare-maximizing.
The experiment is illustrated in Figure 11. The positive productivity shock at Home ro-
tates the ￿ AS￿upward, but when the monetary authorities respond to the shock by loosening
the monetary stance, the exchange rate depreciates and the terms of trade fall, lowering ￿:
a drop in ￿ o⁄sets in part the rotation of the ￿ AS￿due to Z. At the same time, looser
monetary conditions (a higher ￿) shift the ￿ AD￿upward, but less than one-to-one. This is
because, to the extent that import prices rise with exchange rate depreciation, the country
experiences some CPI in￿ ation. The Home economy moves from O to P along the ￿ NR￿
schedule.
The exchange rate depreciation in the Home country improves the terms of trade abroad:
a higher ￿￿ rotates the ￿ AS*￿upward. Note that the ￿ AS*￿rotation does not re￿ ect any
improvement in Foreign productivity (Z￿ remains constant). Lower import prices translate
into a fall of the Foreign CPI. For a given Foreign monetary stance ￿￿, a fall in the price
level raises demand, shifting the ￿ AD*￿curve upwards. The Foreign economy moves from
point O￿ to point P￿ along the ￿ NR*￿schedule, mirroring the adjustment of the Home
economy. In the new equilibrium, Foreign households enjoy a higher level of consumption
for an unchanged level of labor e⁄ort. The international transmission of Home shocks is
unambiguously positive.
In our open-economy model with PCP, the same policy prescription as in the closed-
economy case (￿ = ￿Z ) replicates the allocation with ￿ exible prices: while closing the
Home employment gap completely, it raises consumption at Home and abroad in proportion
to productivity. Given that employment remains constant in equilibrium, higher Home
productivity Z means a higher world supply of Home goods. In an e¢ cient allocation, their
prices must drop. With nominal prices sticky in domestic currency, it is the exchange rate
that induces the e¢ cient adjustment in relative prices, re-directing world demand towards
the more abundant product. Thus, under PCP exchange rate movements are stabilizing. We
should note however that, since the exchange rate is equal to the relative monetary stance,
the ￿ right￿price adjustment through the exchange rate depends on the ￿ right￿conduct of
monetary policy.44
6.4 Market segmentation and imperfect pass-through (the LCP
model)
According to the conventional view, exchange rate movements modify the relative price of
domestic and imported goods. However, empirical studies and casual observation suggest
44From a global perspective, the e⁄ect of the Home monetary expansion can be broken down into two
components. The ￿rst component is symmetric and a⁄ects the level of world demand: a looser monetary
stance at Home translates into a looser monetary stance for the world economy as a whole, raising con-
sumption worldwide. The second component is instead asymmetric and a⁄ects the composition of world
demand. The monetary stance is relatively more expansionary at Home, depreciating the exchange rate,
and redirecting world demand towards Home goods.
25that, in practice, the prices of most imported goods at the consumer level are rather in-
elastic to exchange rate movements.45 Then, exchange rate movements may not induce the
important expenditure switching-e⁄ects that the conventional view places at the heart of
the transmission mechanism.46
Consider our model under the assumption that ￿rms preset prices in domestic currency
for the national market, and in foreign currency for the export market (the LCP case
discussed above). With nominal rigidities, all prices in the world economy are ￿xed in the
short run regardless of currency ￿ uctuations. In contrast to the PCP case, exchange rate
movements neither a⁄ect the price of the Home goods abroad, nor redirect world demand
towards them. The crucial e⁄ect of exchange rate movements in this economy is on ￿rms￿
markups and pro￿ts. Since the Foreign-currency price of the Home goods is preset, a
depreciation of the Home exchange rate raises the revenue in domestic currency of each unit
of product sold abroad: hence the markup over marginal costs increases with depreciation.
But this means that nominal depreciation improves ￿ instead of worsening ￿ the Home
terms of trade.
Let￿ s reconsider the equilibrium e⁄ects of a productivity shock when Home monetary
authorities stabilize the output gap in the new framework (Figure 12). As in the PCP
case above, a positive productivity shock rotates the ￿ AS￿upward, and a Home monetary
expansion raises Home nominal spending. However, their macroeconomic e⁄ects di⁄er from
the PCP case in two important respects. First, raising ￿ now has a much stronger impact
on the aggregate demand, since all consumer prices are sticky in the short run. Even if the
exchange rate depreciates, there is no ￿ imported in￿ ation.￿The ￿ AD￿shifts one-to-one with
￿ (as in the closed economy case). Second, the Home depreciation improves the terms of
trade: ￿ rises with the exchange rate and the ￿ AS￿rotates upwards even further, reinforcing
the initial impact of the productivity shock.
The Home economy moves from point O to point L. In the new equilibrium, employment
is at its natural rate (this is because of our assumption about Home monetary policy), but
stronger terms of trade allow domestic households to increase their consumption much more
than in the PCP case (even more than in the closed-economy case). For any given shock to
Z, the segment OL in Figure 12 is larger than the segment OP in Figure 11. The economy
operates away from its ￿ ex-price benchmark allocation, delivering higher utility to domestic
households.
The extra gains for the Home economy come at the expense of the Foreign country. A
Home expansion has no e⁄ect on Foreign consumption. Foreign consumer prices are preset
in Foreign currency and are therefore inelastic to exchange rate movements in the short
run: the Foreign ￿ AD*￿schedule does not move. Conversely, the Foreign terms of trade now
worsen with the Home currency depreciation. The ￿ AS*￿rotates downward and hours worked
increase: Foreigners need to work more to sustain an unchanged level of consumption. A
higher level of e⁄ort at an unchanged level of consumption unambiguously worsens Foreign
households￿welfare. The international transmission of policy shock is clearly negative, that
is ￿ beggar-thy-neighbor￿ .
Overall, the main predictions of the LCP model are quite distant from the PCP case.
The sign of policy transmission is di⁄erent: positive in the PCP case, negative in the LCP
case. Also far apart are the responses of international prices: in a world with PCP, monetary
45See e.g. Engel (1999), Engel and Rogers (1996), Goldberg and Knetter (1997), Parsley and Wei (2001),
Rogo⁄ (1996).
46See e.g. Engel (2002).
26expansions worsen the terms of trade; they improve it in the LCP case. In the PCP case,
exchange rate movements a⁄ect relative prices for a given consumption level, switching
demand across di⁄erent categories of goods. In the LCP case, there is no expenditure-
switching e⁄ect from exchange rate movements. If anything, what is switched is the labor
burden to sustain world consumption.
6.5 A case of asymmetric transmission (the DP model)
Transmission in an economy where all export prices are set in one currency (the DP case)
somewhat combines the two cases discussed above. The crucial feature of such an economy
is that di⁄erent mechanisms mute the response of ￿ nor ￿￿ to shocks to productivity and/or
the monetary stance. In the Home country, consumer prices do not respond to the exchange
rate, while dollar pricing insulate exporters￿markups from exchange rate movements. In
the Foreign country, the positive e⁄ects of lower import prices are o⁄set by a fall in pro￿ts
from exports: the local-currency value of export sales fall with the Home depreciation.
We can visualize these e⁄ects in Figure 13. Once again, the shock to Z tilts the ￿ AS￿
upward and prompts an increase in ￿ to close the output gap. In the Home country, where
all prices are preset in Home currency, the monetary expansion raises domestic demand
one-to-one. The ensuing Home depreciation has no implications for the pro￿ts of domestic
￿rms, since pass-through of exchange rate movements onto Home export prices is complete.
Consumption rises above the natural rate, while employment remains at the natural rate.
The Home economy moves from O to D, where the length of the segment OD lies somewhere
between OP in Figure 11 and OL in Figure 12.
In the Foreign country, Home depreciation translates into lower import prices, hence
into a lower CPI. For a given domestic monetary stance, the ￿ AD*￿shifts upward. But since
there is no e⁄ect on the relative price of consumption in terms of output ￿￿, the ￿ AS*￿does
not rotate. The Foreign economy moves from point O￿ to point D￿ along the unchanged
￿ AS*￿schedule. Thus, in the new equilibrium Foreign households enjoy higher consumption
(actually, as high as in the PCP case: O￿D￿ in Figure 13 is equal to O￿P￿ in Figure 10),
but also work more. In other words, the international transmission is positive as regards
consumption, negative as regards labor e⁄ort. However, because of monopolistic distortions
in production, the ￿rst component dominates and the international transmission is overall
positive.47
Note that, from the point of view of Foreign consumers, the exchange rate plays a
stabilizing role in the product market: a Home depreciation lowers the price of Home goods.
The sign of the adjustment is consistent with the ￿ exible-price benchmark. But the negative
implications of exchange rate movements on Foreign ￿rms￿pro￿ts are clearly ￿ destabilizing.￿
Vis-a-vis the received wisdom on international transmission (corresponding to the PCP case)
and its strongest critique (the LCP case), the case of ￿ dollar pricing￿stresses the realistic
possibility of counteracting e⁄ects from exchange rate movements within an economy.
To conclude our analysis of transmission in the DP case, it is worth noticing that the
Home economy is fully insulated from external shocks: for any given ￿ and Z, exchange
rate shocks or cyclical developments abroad have no macroeconomic e⁄ects on output, con-
sumption and terms of trade in the Home country. Thus, when Home policymakers respond
to local productivity shocks there are repercussions in the rest of the world as illustrated
47Because of monopoly power in production, the representative agent￿ s indi⁄erence curve in the pre-shock
equilibrium cuts the ￿ AS*￿from above. Hence a movement along the ￿ AS*￿raises welfare (as long as it is
not too large).
27in Figure 13, but when Foreign policymakers react to local shocks there are no spillovers
to the Home country economy. This asymmetry stems from the predominant role in global
trade of the ￿ vehicle￿currency issued by the Home country.
7 International dimensions of optimal policy
Do optimal stabilization rules in an open economy deviate from their counterparts in closed
economy? How do openness and trade a⁄ect the design and conduct of monetary policy?
In this section we take a ￿rst pass at these issues by studying optimal policies for each of
the three speci￿cations of export pricing, i.e. PCP, LCP and DP. We discuss both the case
in which national policymakers design their policies independently of each other, and the
case in which they do so in a cooperative way.48
7.1 Optimal monetary rules and the gains from international coor-
dination
In the absence of international coordination, Home policymakers determine their welfare-
optimizing monetary stance by maximizing W as de￿ned in (14) with respect to ￿, while
taking the monetary policy in the other country ￿￿ as given. Similarly, Foreign authorities
maximixe W￿ with respect to ￿￿ given ￿. We denote the monetary stances independently
chosen by the two authorities with ￿Non￿Coop and ￿￿
Non￿Coop. In a cooperative equilibrium,
instead, national authorities jointly maximize a weighted average of Home and Foreign
welfare 0:5W +0:5W￿, whereas the weights coincide with the share of each country in world
consumption. The cooperative monetary stances are denoted ￿Coop and ￿￿
Coop.
The PCP model Our model with PCP provides an example in which the optimal policy
in open economy is identical to the optimal policy in closed economy: domestic policymakers
focus exclusively on the domestic output gap, o⁄setting any ￿ uctuation in employment and
output around their natural level.
In the context of a non-cooperative equilibrium, using the pricing equilibrium expressions
with PCP, the policy problem in the Home country can be written as
max
￿
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The optimal monetary policy satis￿es ￿PCP
Non￿Coop = ￿Z, precisely the same expression as in
the closed economy.49 The optimal policy is completely ￿ inward looking,￿in the sense that
it is only concerned with domestic shocks. Symmetrically, in the Foreign country the policy
problem is:
max
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48Selected references on policy rules for open economies include Ball (1999), Benigno (2002, 2004), Gali
and Monacelli (2005), Ghironi and Rebucci (2002), Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), Monacelli (2005),
Obstfeld (2002), Sutherland (2005), Svensson (2000). This section builds on the synthesis model by Corsetti
and Pesenti (2005).
49See e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001).
28which yields ￿￿PCP
Non￿Coop = ￿￿Z￿. Note that ￿ and ￿￿ may di⁄er, re￿ ecting national prefer-
ences over the desired rate of in￿ ation. If the two steady-state in￿ ation rates are di⁄erent,
there will be a trend for the nominal exchange rate equal to the in￿ ation di⁄erential, without
e⁄ects on the steady-state real exchange rate.
Are there gains from international policy cooperation? To answer this question note that,
with PCP, the objective function of the Home policymakers in (46) is identical to the Foreign
objective function (47): in other words, W = W￿. Maximizing an average of W and W￿
yields exactly the the same optimal policy prescriptions ￿PCP
Coop = ￿Z and ￿￿PCP
Coop = ￿￿Z￿.
The non-cooperative rules remain the best policy rules also under cooperation: by ￿ keeping
one￿ s house in order￿ , policymakers are already able to achieve economic e¢ ciency.50 This
result provides an extreme version of the case for ￿ exible exchange rates made by Friedman
(1953): even without price ￿ exibility, monetary authorities can engineer the right adjustment
in relative prices through exchange rate movements. In our model with PCP, expenditure-
switching e⁄ects make exchange rate and price movements perfect substitutes.51
The LCP model The optimality of ￿ inward-looking￿policy rules, however, is not a general
result. Notably, with LCP, the optimal policy rule still prescribes some degree of output
gap stabilization, but complete stabilization is not desirable. Under LCP the Home policy
problem in a non-cooperative equilibrium can be written as:
max
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￿ = 1 (49)
Home policymakers stabilize a weighted average of Home and Foreign marginal costs, using
the CPI weights for the Home and the Foreign goods.
Why? Suppose that the Home monetary authorities followed an ￿ inward looking￿rule, i.e.
they completely stabilized Home marginal costs, moving ￿ to o⁄set productivity shocks as
in Figure 11. While such conduct would completely stabilize domestic producers￿markups,
Foreign ￿rms selling in the Home country would face a high degree of exchange rate vari-
ability, a⁄ecting the expected discounted pro￿ts from the Home market (with reference to
Figure 11, they would su⁄er large ￿ uctuations of employment away from the ￿ exible-price
natural level). Foreign ￿rms will then react to volatility of pro￿ts by raising their average
markups in their export markets, charging higher prices for their products sold in the Home
country. The intuition underlying this result is the same as discussed in the closed-economy
case, with reference to Figure 5.
Home policymakers thus face a trade-o⁄between stabilizing the marginal costs/markups
of domestic producers (translating into lower Home good prices) and stabilizing the marginal
costs/markups of Foreign producers￿(translating into lower import prices). At an optimum,
they will pursue some average between the two, depending on the weight of imports in the
consumption basket of Home households. This is precisely the interpretation of (49).
50See Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002).
51The equivalence between Nash equilibrium and ￿ex-price allocation need not go through under more
general conditions, e,g. with less restrictive preference speci￿cations as shown by Benigno and Benigno
(2003).
29The magnitude of the optimal deviation from ￿ inward looking￿rules depends on a coun-
try￿ s degree of trade openness. In our stylized model, half of the domestic consumption
expenditure falls on foreign goods. In the case of small and very open economies, there is
a strong incentive to pursue policy rules that are quite ￿ outward oriented.￿In large and less
open economies, these considerations may a⁄ect policy design only marginally.
Because of the international spillovers of monetary policy on international pricing, one
may expect that with LCP there will always be an incentive to cooperate. Surprisingly,
however, this is not the case in our model. To see why, note that the objective function of
Foreign policymakers is identical to (48), except that ln￿ is replaced by ln￿￿. Hence the


















￿ = 1 (50)
Comparing (49) with (50) shows that both policymakers stabilize exactly the same weighted
average of Home and Foreign marginal costs. Hence they pursue exactly the same monetary
policy, ￿LCP
Non￿Coop = ￿￿LCP
Non￿Coop, implying that the nominal exchange rate does not react
to shocks. Instead of closing the domestic output gap completely, national policymakers
take into account the e⁄ects of their policies on exchange rate variability. In equilibrium,
an e¢ cient monetary rule limits exchange rate ￿ uctuations.52
Solving the cooperative problem does not change this prescription at all. There are no
gains from cooperation not because domestic policymaking is already e¢ cient (as in the
PCP case, where there are no spillovers in equilibrium), but because what can be achieved
by cooperating (the stability or predictability of the exchange rate) is already achieved
in the absence of cooperation. As the only spillovers in the world economy stem from
exchange rate movements, the world economy cannot gain by pursuing asymmetric policies
that imply exchange rate ￿ uctuations. Once again, ￿ keeping one house in order￿is the best
rule of conduct.
The DP model An interesting case of asymmetric deviation from inward-looking rules
is provided by an economy with Dollar Pricing. In this case, Home welfare is equal to
(48), so that Home optimal monetary policy must satisfy (49). Foreign welfare is (46).
Correspondingly, the Foreign optimal policy is completely inward-looking. So, the country
that issues the currency used worldwide for export pricing (the Home country) optimally
responds to shocks hitting the global economy. The other country only needs to stabilize
domestic markups.
The interest in this case mainly concerns its implication for the desirability of inter-
national policy cooperation. World welfare indeed increases when monetary policy rules
are designed in a cooperative way (by maximizing an equally weighted average of the two
national welfare functions). However, the cooperative and noncooperative optimal policy
rules coincide for the Foreign country, but not for the Home country. The ￿ contribution￿to
cooperation is therefore unilateral: only the Home country is expected to modify its rules.
This raises an interesting issue, as to whether there is any incentive for this country to enter
any binding cooperative agreement regarding stabilization policy.
52This point is emphasized by Devereux and Engel (2003).
307.2 Exchange rate regimes and the macroeconomy
Comparing models We conclude our analysis of optimal monetary policies with a brief
assessment of the implications for international business cycles and the choice of an exchange
rate regime. In what follows we assume that monetary authorities implement the optimal
monetary stances characterized above.
According to the PCP model, exchange rate movements contribute to stabilization and
welfare, hence exchange rate ￿ exibility is desirable. In the long run, national in￿ ation rates
are equal to the desired rates set by policymakers and the exchange rate depreciates at a rate
equal to the in￿ ation di⁄erential. In the short-run, the exchange rate evolves stochastically
around its long-run trend, and monetary authorities let the domestic currency depreciate
when the country is hit by a positive productivity shock. Exchange rate ￿ exibility is desirable
to the extent that it is driven exclusively by optimal state-contingent monetary policies.
According to the LCP model, exchange rate movements do not contribute to e¢ cient rela-
tive price adjustment. On the contrary, exchange rate movements create negative spillovers
that are rationally avoided by welfare-maximizing policymakers. Observe, however, that
this result does not necessarily coincide with optimality of ￿xed exchange rate regimes.
Di⁄erences in desired national in￿ ation rates may still be optimally accommodated by pol-
icymakers, inducing predictable trend depreciation. What is welfare-reducing is exchange
rate stochastic variability around such trend.
With PCP, cross-border output correlation depends on the joint distribution of funda-
mentals ￿ GDP changes only in the country experiencing productivity shocks. With LCP
instead, Home and Foreign monetary authorities optimally react to the same average of
Home and Foreign shocks. This implies that when the Home country experiences produc-
tivity gains and its employment falls, employment increases in the Foreign country with
stable productivity. Because of adverse terms of trade movements, the equilibrium alloca-
tion coincides with an ine¢ cient level of output expansions in both countries. An important
implication is that, for any given exogenous distribution of productivity shocks, cross-border
output correlation is higher under the ￿xed exchange rate system consistent with LCP than
under the ￿ oating exchange rate system consistent with PCP.
The DP economy is once again an intermediate case between the previous two. Ex-
change rate ￿ exibility is desirable, although one country ￿nds it optimal to stabilize to some
extent currency ￿ uctuations (depending on its openness). Both consumption and output
are positively correlated.
Conditional on implementing optimal monetary policy rules, welfare under PCP is al-
ways above welfare in the other two cases. Optimal exchange rate ￿ exibility and producer
currency pricing is actually the best possible combination of policy and pricing regimes for
our economies.53
Welfare and macroeconomic comparison across models are more complex, however, when
monetary authorities do not adopt optimal rules. The main consequences of insu¢ cient
stabilization on markups and the price level are the same as in the closed economy, and
need not be repeated here. We only observe that in open economy insu¢ cient stabilization
will also a⁄ect the level of the real exchange rate.54 With LCP, for instance, the real
53Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) however point out the possibility of self-validating equilibria where ￿rms
choose to price in local currency, and monetary authorities implement the optimal rule under LCP. The
exchange rate regime, the monetary policy rule and pricing behavior are all endogenous in this equilibrium.
54See Broda (2004) for an empirical assessment.
31exchange of the country adopting ine¢ cient policies will be excessively appreciated relative
to its trading partner.
Domestic and international policy trade-o⁄s Most contributions to the international
macro literature on stabilization have focused on economies that are perfectly specialized in
the production of a single tradable good. The analysis of policy dilemmas has therefore been
centered on the trade-o⁄between stabilizing domestic prices and output gap, and containing
the volatility of exchange rates and Foreign exporters￿pro￿ts ￿ as this may translate into
higher average prices of their products.
However, other policy trade-o⁄s may be relevant. For instance, in imperfectly special-
ized or multi-sector economies with nominal rigidities, industry-speci￿c shocks rule out the
possibility that exchange rate movements be perfect substitute for relative price adjust-
ment. Policymakers face higher-dimensional trade-o⁄s between stabilizing marginal costs
and production in di⁄erent sectors of the economy.55
Consider a version of our simple model including a non-traded goods sector in each
country. Both traded and nontraded goods are subject to nominal price rigidities, and
are subject to sector-speci￿c productivity shocks. In addition, exporters preset prices in
local currency. Now, when the nontraded good sector is hit by a positive idiosyncratic
shock, monetary authorities ￿nd it optimal to expand domestic monetary policy even if the
implied exchange rate depreciation has no desirable e⁄ects on domestic welfare, i.e., even
if there are no expenditure-switching e⁄ects stemming from exchange rate movements. In
other words, optimal policies will imply some exchange rate movements ￿ although with
LCP these movements are not e¢ cient.56 The bene￿ts from stabilizing the domestic output
gap outweigh the costs of deviating from exchange rate stability. It follows that the absence
of expenditure switching e⁄ects is not a su¢ cient argument against exchange rate ￿ exibility.
8 The open-economy model: discussion and extensions
8.1 Discretion vs. commitment in open economy
In this section, we compare the policy problem under commitment with the policy problem
under discretion. As for the closed-economy case, we will show that the optimal policy, in
general, is not time-consistent. In an open economy, however, terms of trade considerations
mitigate and possibly o⁄set the in￿ ationary bias analyzed in Section 4.1.
Consider once again the policy problem under discretion: Home policymakers maximize
agents￿current utility with respect to ￿ after observing the shocks Z and Z￿, taking ￿rms￿
prices as well as Foreign policy as given. Foreign policymakers solve a similar problem.


























55See e.g. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2005), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002), and Tille (2002).
56See e.g. Duarte and Obstfeld (2004). Similarly, Devereux and Engel (2004) stress the possibility of
￿ competing objectives￿for monetary policy (i.e. policy trade-o⁄s) that potentially undermine optimality of
￿xed rates in models with LCP. These authors contrast aggregate demand e⁄ects of monetary policy with
relative price e⁄ects under di⁄erent assumptions about the degree of nominal rigidities and the elasticity of
substitution in the goods market, distinguishing between intermediate goods and ￿nal goods.
32We have seen that in a closed economy, monopolistic distortions in production create an
incentive for the policymakers to expand demand and bring output to its Pareto-e¢ cient
level 1=k. This need not be true in an open economy. The above expressions make clear
that policymakers will have an incentive to either expand or contract aggregate demand
(given prices) depending on whether the import share in consumption, equal to 1/2 in our
speci￿cation, is above or below the reciprocal of the markup (￿ ￿ 1)=￿.
Intuitively, in an open economy monopolistic distortions in production coexist with terms
of trade distortions, whose magnitude depends ￿ among other things ￿ on the degree of
openness of the economy. Under discretion, welfare-maximizing policymakers expand aggre-
gate demand if the former distortions are su¢ ciently important relative to the latter. When
monopoly power in production is su¢ ciently high (￿ < 2 in our speci￿cation), policymakers
are less concerned with adverse import price movements due to an exchange rate deprecia-
tion than with the ine¢ cient level of domestic output. By the same token, in economies that
are relatively closed to trade, the exchange rate a⁄ects the price of a relatively small share
of consumption goods. Also in this case, benevolent policymakers will have an incentive to
raise output above market equilibrium.
The reverse is true when monopolistic distortions in production are relatively low (￿ > 2),
or the economy is su¢ ciently open. In the latter case, while raising output and employment,
a monetary expansion would also increase the price of a substantial proportion of consump-
tion goods. When terms of trade movements become the dominant concern in discretionary
policy making, monetary authorities actually prefer to engineer surprise re-valuations, as
a way to improve the relative prices of their country￿ s output.57 It follows that the above
conditions cannot be part of a rational expectations equilibrium, except in the special case
in which ￿ = 2.
Reducing the degree of pass-through would clearly blunt the terms of trade e⁄ects of






















In this case, discretionary policy is unambiguously biased towards surprise monetary expan-
sions.
Suppose now that governments can use a ￿scal instrument to correct average domestic
monopolistic distortions. Suppose that it sets a subsidy to production at the rate (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1







(1 ￿ ￿) = 1 (53)
Observe that the subsidy rate is smaller than in the closed-economy case (in our speci￿cation,
it is half the size than in closed economy). It is easy to verify that, in the PCP model with
the above subsidy in place, the ￿rst order conditions of the policy problems under discretion
coincide with the ￿rst order conditions under commitment. They both imply ￿ = ￿Z.
But the equivalence between discretionary policy and optimal policy under commitment
does not hold in general ￿ as ￿rms￿pro￿ts may still be exposed to exchange rate variability.






















57On the relation between openness and in￿ation see e.g. Romer (1993) and Lane (1997).
33Clearly, setting ￿ and ￿
￿according to (53) and its Foreign analog does not eliminate the in-
centive to resort systematically to surprise expansions. The reason is that, under discretion,
national policymakers take goods￿prices as given, and therefore ￿nd it optimal to respond
to domestic productivity shocks while ignoring the e⁄ects of domestic monetary policy on
the markup of producers abroad. In that case, however, Foreign exporters would react to an
increase in the variability of their markups by raising average prices in the Home country.
Under commitment, instead, Home policymakers take these e⁄ects into account and
respond to both Home and Foreign shocks. They contain exchange rate and terms of trade
movements so as to reduce their e⁄ects on the income of Foreign producers, trading o⁄
complete stabilization of Home producers￿pro￿ts with lower import prices.
8.2 Determinants of pass-through
As discussed above, the literature has stressed vast di⁄erences among transmission mecha-
nisms and welfare properties in economies characterized by di⁄erent degrees of pass-through.
Before drawing strong conclusions from the LCP vs. PCP debate, however, it is worth ad-
dressing a few additional empirical dimensions of the link between prices and exchange
rates.
First and foremost, the elasticity of prices with respect to exchange rate movements
varies between the import- and the consumer-price levels. Even if consumer prices are sticky
in the short run, ￿ uctuations of import (border) prices may still bring about substantial
expenditure-switching e⁄ects.
Second, the degree of nominal rigidity varies with the time horizon, and ￿rms￿pricing
decisions have an inherent dynamics. Even if in￿ ation inertia is highly relevant in the short
term, we may expect a gradual adjustment of prices over time. As both domestic and
foreign prices change in response to shocks that also move the exchange rate, the impact
of exchange rate movements on the terms of trade may change depending on whether one
focuses on the very short run, or allow for longer horizons.
A promising way to address these issues above is taken in recent models that allow for
distribution services intensive in local inputs or local assembling of imported intermediate
inputs.58 Namely, let the Home-currency consumer price of one unit of Home imports be
the sum of the producer price (denoted by a bar) and the cost of nontraded distribution
services in local currency, DSt:
PF = PF + DS = EP￿
F + DS: (55)
Even if the law of one price holds at the border and PF = EP￿
F, the elasticity of consumer
prices to exchange rate movements will be less than one, re￿ ecting the weight of distribution
in the consumer price. In addition, distribution costs in the consumer market are likely to
make the price elasticity of consumption demand market-speci￿c, thus providing monop-
olistic ￿rms with an incentive to discriminate prices across borders regardless of nominal
rigidities.59
58See Erceg and Levin (1995), McCallum and Nelson (1999), MacDonald and Ricci (2001), Burstein,
Neves and Rebelo (2003), Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2004) and Corsetti and Dedola (2005). According
to the estimates by Anderson and van Wincoop (2005) and Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003), in the US
the average distribution margin is as high as 50 percent ￿ i.e. distributive trade accounts for 50 percent
of the retail price of consumption goods. This includes wholesale and retail services, marketing, advertising
and local transportation.
59This point is developed by Corsetti and Dedola (2005). Of course, in addition to distribution costs,
34This is an important result, in light of substantial evidence of price discrimination:60
models where deviations from the law of one price are an exclusive implication of nominal
rigidities (and therefore a short-run phenomenon) miss features of the international economy
that are quite consequential for model building and policy analysis. Namely, they may
overlook persistent price discrepancies across regions or over time, and/or overestimate the
degree of nominal price rigidities required to explain the stability in local currency of import
prices. Assessing the relative importance of optimal price discrimination and monetary
frictions in generating incomplete pass-through is clearly a relevant goal for future research.
Last, we should observe that, facing constraints on price adjustment, ￿rms are nonethe-
less free to choose whether to post preset prices in domestic currency only, or in both
domestic and foreign currencies. What are the determinants of this choice? We have con-
sidered above some of the factors intervening in this choice, but the set of determinants is
clearly larger. A substantial body of literature is moving in these directions, with promising
results.61
9 Conclusion
This paper has presented a stylized but rigorous framework that illustrates fundamental
traits of the recent stabilization literature, and sheds light on the architecture of fully-￿ edged
quantitative models in international macroeconomics. As DSGE models are increasingly
used as tools for policy evaluation by domestic and international institutions, one of the
goals of this paper is to provide an introductory set of analytical instruments to convey
the main ideas about international transmission and stabilization policies underlying these
models, as well as to provide a smorgasbord of basic questions and intuitions that are
developed in quantitative work.
This paper does not provide an exhaustive account of the literature. Several contribu-
tions are currently building rich analytical and quantitative frameworks to address crucial
stylized facts of the international economy ￿ such as the low degree of international risk-
sharing documented by Backus and Smith (1993), the excess volatility of real exchange
rates relative to standard macro variables, or the dynamics of comparative advantages in
the world economy. The literature is also exploring macroeconomic implications of frictions
in the asset and credit markets, with the goal of integrating ￿nancial and real aspects of the
international transmission. At the same time, pressing policy issues are raising the hurdles
for DSGE models, e.g. current account dynamics and the adjustment to global imbalances.
Empirical and theoretical research is clearly needed to shed light on the international
transmission of productivity, monetary and ￿nancial shocks ￿ determining the sign and
magnitude of cross-border spillovers ￿ as well as on the determinants and cyclical properties
of net exports of goods, services and factors. Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that the new
paradigm of choice-theoretic models has already been contributing many empirical and
theoretical elements to our understanding of the international economy.
there are other possible reasons why the price elasticity may be market speci￿c. See for instance Bergin and
Feenstra (2001).
60See Dornbusch (1987), Krugman (1987), Knetter (1989, 1993), Marston (1990) and Goldberg and Ver-
boven (2001).
61See Engel (2005) for a recent synthesis.
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* l lAppendix 1 Algebra of the closed-economy model
The economy consists of households, ￿rms, and the government. Households and ￿rms
are de￿ned over a continuum of unit mass. Households are indexed by j 2 [0;1], ￿rms are
indexed by h 2 [0;1]. Each ￿rm produces a variety (brand), which is an imperfect substitute
to all other varieties under conditions of monopolistic competition.
















where ￿ < 1 is the discount rate, Ct(j) is consumption, ‘t(j) labor e⁄ort, Mt(j) money
holdings, Pt is the price of one unit of consumption (the Consumer Price Index, or CPI), ￿
is a positive parameter measuring utility from real balances, and ￿ is a positive parameter
measuring disutility of labor e⁄ort.
Consumption Ct(j) is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) basket of all varieties








￿ > 1 (A.2)
where Ct(h;j) is consumption of variety h by household j, and ￿ is the elasticity of substi-
tution across varieties. Note that ￿ is bounded from below by 1. When ￿ tends to in￿nity
all varieties are perfect substitutes for each other.
Properties of the Consumer Price Index The price of a variety h is denoted p(h).








This speci￿c functional form for the CPI is not chosen arbitrarily. In fact, the above price
index is the minimum expenditure required to buy a given amount of the composite con-










Consider the following Lagrangian:
LCPI















where ￿t is a Lagrange multiplier (whose economic interpretation will be clear in few pas-


















￿ = 0 (A.5)




































so that the Lagrangian multiplier is the CPI itself.







Consumption of variety h depends on two elements: the price of variety h relative to all
other varieties, with price elasticity ￿, and the size of household j￿ s total consumption. Note






























t Ct(j) = PtCt(j) (A.11)















The convention throughout this Appendix is that variables without an index (j) are ex-
pressed in per-capita terms.
Budget constraint and consumer optimization Household j receives a wage in-
come and dividends from the ￿rms, pays taxes to the government, purchases consumption
goods, and accumulates money and a nominal bond. The individual ￿ ow budget constraint
at time ￿ is therefore:
M￿(j) + B￿(j) ￿ M￿￿1(j) + (1 + i￿￿1)B￿￿1(j) + W￿‘￿(j) + P￿(j) ￿ NETT￿(j) ￿ P￿C￿(j)
(A.14)
where B￿ are holdings of the bond, i￿ the nominal interest rate, W￿ is the nominal
wage, P￿(j) are nominal dividends, and NETT(j) are non-distortionary (lump-sum) net
iitaxes denominated in national currency. As households own the portfolio of all ￿rms,
P￿(j) =
R 1
0 P￿(h)dh. In the expression above, the nominal yield i￿￿1 is paid at the be-
ginning of period ￿ and is known at time ￿ ￿ 1.
Taking prices and wages as given, Home agent j maximizes (A.1) subject to the sequence
of ￿ ow budget constraints (A.14) for f￿g
1
t with respect to consumption, labor e⁄ort, and









￿￿tfD￿(j)[M￿(j) + B￿(j) ￿ M￿￿1(j) ￿ (1 + i￿￿1)B￿￿1(j)
￿W￿‘￿(j) ￿ P￿(j) + NETT￿(j) + P￿C￿(j)]g (A.15)
where D￿(j) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the ￿ ow budget constraint at time
￿.






￿ Dt(j)Pt = 0 (A.16)
The multiplier Dt(j) measures the increase in household j￿s utility (shadow price) associated
with one additional unit of nominal wealth. It is the product of two terms: 1=Pt transforms
nominal wealth into consumption baskets, and 1=Ct(j) accounts for household j￿ s need for
additional real wealth (a decreasing function of current consumption).




= ￿Dt(j) + ￿ (1 + it)EtDt+1(j) = 0 (A.17)




















= Et (Qt;t+1(j)) (A.19)
where ￿t+1 ￿ Pt+1=Pt ￿ 1 is the in￿ ation rate.






￿ Dt(j) + ￿EtDt+1(j) = 0 (A.20)
according to which money holdings are proportional to nominal spending.
Finally, the ￿rst order condition with respect to ‘t(j) yields:
@Lt(j)
@‘t(j)
= ￿￿ + WtDt(j) = 0 (A.21)
Workers equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, ￿Ct(j),
to the real wage in consumption units, Wt=Pt. Note that, with a common CPI index, the
previous expression implies equalization of consumption across agents, or:
Ct(j) = Ct; Dt(j) = Dt; Qt;t+￿(j) = Qt;t+￿. (A.22)
iiiFirms Each ￿rm produces a variety h employing labor supplied by the households.
The technology of production is linear in labor e⁄ort:
Yt(h) = Zt‘t(h) (A.23)
where Yt(h) is the output of ￿rm h, ‘t(h) is the labor input used by ￿rm h, and Zt is a
productivity process common to all ￿rms.
Firm h minimizes costs Wt‘t(h) subject to the above technology. The Lagrangian mul-
tiplier associated with this problem is the nominal marginal cost MCt(h), equal to:




Note that marginal costs are symmetric across ￿rms. In equilibrium the supply of variety h





Pro￿t maximization and price setting Firms operating under conditions of mo-
nopolistic competition take into account the downward-sloping demand for their product
(A.12) and set prices to maximize their value. Firms are small, in the sense that they ig-
nore the impact of their pricing and production decisions on aggregate variables and price
indexes.
Let Pt(h) denote ￿rm h￿ s nominal dividends:













Without nominal rigidities, in each period ￿rm h optimally chooses p(h) to maximize current





The price of variety h is equal to the marginal cost, Wt=Zt, augmented by a constant markup
￿=(￿ ￿ 1) that re￿ ects the monopoly power of the ￿rm, which in itself is a function of the
substitutability between h and the other varieties.
With nominal rigidities, the price pt(h) is set before the realization of the productivity
and policy shocks, based on available information. The ￿rm￿ s problem is to maximize the
present discounted value of expected pro￿ts Qt￿1;t Pt(h), where Qt￿1;t is the households￿
(i.e. shareholders￿ ) discount rate:
max
pt(h)
Et￿1 (Qt￿1;tPt(h)) = Et￿1
 






















































According to the previous expression, the price under nominal rigidities is equal to the ex-
pected marginal cost, appropriately discounted. This expression can be further simpli￿ed by
recalling that Qt￿1;t = ￿Pt￿1Ct￿1=PtCt, and observing that all prices pt(h) are symmetric,
thus pt(h) = Pt:




As a corollary, the fact that ￿ with or without nominal rigidities ￿ all prices are
symmetric and pt(h) = Pt, implies that consumption of each variety is symmetric as well:
Ct(h;j) = Ct(j) = Ct (from (A.10) and (A.22)). In turn, the supply of each variety is
symmetric: Yt(h) = Ct (from (A.25)) and ‘t(h) = Ct=Zt (from (A.23)), or:
Ct = Zt‘t (A.32)
Monetary policy and the government budget constraint In our text, we de￿ne
the monetary stance as ￿t = PtCt. It is instructive to note that, using this de￿nition, we
can rewrite the Euler equation of the national representative consumer as follows:
1
￿t






Integrating this expression forward, we express ￿t as a forward looking variable, depending










(1 + it+￿): (A.34)












As there is no public spending, the government uses seigniorage revenues and taxes to
￿nance transfers. The public budget constraint is simply:
Mt ￿ Mt￿1 +
Z 1
0
NETTt(j)dj = 0 (A.36)
and in equilibrium money supply equals demand, or Mt =
R 1
0 Mt(j)dj.
Finally, the bond is in zero net supply:
Z 1
0
Bt(j)dj = 0: (A.37)
so that Bt = 0 in aggregate terms.
















which implies that, regardless of the shocks hitting the economy, labor is always at some
constant level that depends on two elements: the degree of monopoly power (the less com-
petitive the economy, the lower the average level of labor e⁄ort), and the sensitivity of
disutility to labor e⁄ort (when work is painful and k is high, households will supply little





Correspondingly, [(￿ ￿ 1)=(￿￿)]Z measures potential output.











Et￿1 (‘t) = ￿ ‘. (A.42)
Prices are set such that, on average, ￿rms minimize deviations of output from potential and
households minimize deviations of labor from the natural rate.
Macroeconomic synthesis Summing up, the macroeconomic equations of the model
are:
Ct = Zt‘t (A.43)






￿ ￿ ‘ or P
flex
t = ￿ ‘￿1 ￿t
Zt









under sticky prices (A.46)
where Zt and ￿t are exogenous variables, and Ct, Pt, and ‘t are endogenous variables.
Abstracting from real balance e⁄ects ￿ which are unlikely to be signi￿cant ￿ the
instantaneous utility ￿ ow in (A.1) is given by Ut = lnCt ￿ ￿‘t. Note that the slope of the










Zt < Zt (A.47)
This slope (marginal rate of substitution) is smaller than the slope of the production function
(marginal rate of transformation) because of the distortion stemming from monopoly power.
viOptimal monetary stance We now focus on the design of optimal monetary rules
￿de￿ned as rules that maximize the expected utility of the representative household ￿in
the presence of uncertainty and one-period nominal rigidities. Once again, we disregard the
utility gains from real balances, so that the optimal monetary stance ￿t solves the problem:
max
￿t
Et￿1 (lnCt ￿ ￿‘t) (A.48)
Recall that Et￿1(‘t) = ￿ ‘, so that the second term in utility is independent of monetary
policy and we need only focus on consumption. Welfare can then be written as:








= const: + Et￿1 ln￿t ￿ lnEt￿1 (￿t=Zt) (A.49)
Take the ￿rst order condition for a maximum, recalling that:
df [E(g [X])]
dX















According to the previous expression, monetary policy responds one-to one to productivity
shocks, stabilizing ￿rms￿markups.
Fiscal policy We conclude this Appendix by modifying the model in two dimensions.















The key implication of this modi￿cation is that the ￿rst order condition for optimal labor
e⁄ort ￿ that is, the equivalent of (A.21) ￿ becomes:
Wt = ￿PtCt‘t(j)￿ (A.54)
An increase in labor e⁄ort is now associated with an increase in the real wage (and marginal
cost MC).
Second, we introduce public demand in the model and study the macroeconomic e⁄ects
of government purchases of goods from ￿rms. In what follows, we posit that public spending
is purely dissipative, with no impact on households￿utility.
Assuming that public spending falls on the same basket of varieties as private consump-







where Gt is total government consumption. The budget constraint of the public sectors is
now:
Mt ￿ Mt￿1 +
Z 1
0
NETTt(j)dj = PtGt (A.56)




Ct(h;j)dj + Gt(h) (A.57)
and ￿rm h￿ s nominal dividends are now:





(Ct + Gt) (A.58)





Hereafter and in the main text, we assume that gt is a random variable ￿ government
spending shock takes the form of unexpected changes in the ratio of public to private con-
sumption.












Recalling that PtCt = ￿t, and observing that the resource constraint can be written as:
Ct(1 + gt) = Zt‘t; (A.61)




































￿￿ ‘(1 + g)
￿ 1
1+￿ , ‘t =
￿￿ ‘(1 + gt)
￿ 1
1+￿ (A.64)
implying that both the natural rate of employment and output are a function of ￿scal
variables.























pt(h) = Pt =
￿
￿ ￿ 1
Et￿1 [MCt (1 + gt)]







t (1 + gt)=Zt]
Et￿1 (1 + gt)
(A.66)









(￿t (1 + gt)=Zt)
1+￿
i
Et￿1 (1 + gt)
(A.67)
viiiSumming up, the macroeconomic equations of the model are:
Gt = gtCt (A.68)
Ct (1 + gt) = Zt‘t (A.69)

















1+￿ under ￿ exible prices
(A.71)
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(￿t (1 + gt)=Zt)
1+￿
i






where Zt, ￿t and gt are exogenous variables, Ct, Pt, and ‘t endogenous.
The analysis above would be identical if we assumed that government spending enters
households￿utility in an additively separable way, so that an increase in public spending has
no e⁄ect on the marginal utility of consumption or the marginal disutility of labor e⁄ort.
Shocks to spending would then also a⁄ect utility directly. However, a welfare maximizing
￿scal authority would prevent random ￿ uctuation of government spending. As for monetary
policy, optimal ￿scal spending will also tend to be expansionary in response to positive
productivity shocks, and contractionary in response to negative productivity shocks.
Appendix 2 Algebra of the two-country model
Consider the open-economy extension of the model analyzed above. The world economy
consists now of two symmetric countries, Home and Foreign. In each country there are
households, ￿rms, and a government. Home households and ￿rms are de￿ned over a con-
tinuum of unit mass, with indexes j 2 [0;1] and h 2 [0;1] as in the closed-economy model.
Foreign households and ￿rms are also de￿ned over a continuum of unit mass, with indexes
j￿ 2 [0;1] and f 2 [0;1].
Households are immobile across countries and they own national ￿rms. Firms in each
country specialize in the production of a country-speci￿c good. Each ￿rm produces a variety
(brand) of the national good which is an imperfect substitute to all other varieties under
conditions of monopolistic competition.
We develop our analysis assuming that markets are complete, so that households can
e¢ ciently share consumption risk.
Home and Foreign households The utility of household j is the same as in (A.1):




where Ct(j) is now a Cobb-Douglas basket (that is, a CES basket with unit elasticity) of
the Home and Foreign goods with equal weights (1/2, 1/2):
Ct(j) = CH;t(j)1=2CF;t(j)1=2 (B.2)
















For simplicity, the elasticity of substitution across varieties, ￿, is the same across coun-
tries. This speci￿cation implies that the degree of substitution between domestic goods and
imports is lower than the degree of substitution among varieties (1 < ￿).
Foreign households are analogously characterized. The utility of household j￿ is:
U￿
t (j￿) = lnC￿








t (j￿) is a Cobb-Douglas basket:
C￿

























For given Home-currency prices of the varieties, pt(h) and pt(f), the utility-based CPI,




















Following the same steps as in Appendix 1, one can show that Pt is the minimum expenditure
associated with consumption of one unit of the index Ct. Also, the Home-country individual























and the optimal composition of nominal spending is:










































































As in the closed-economy case, Home households own the portfolio of Home ￿rms, hold
the Home currency, M, receive wages and pro￿ts from the ￿rms and pay non-distortionary
(lump-sum) net taxes NETT, denominated in Home currency. Di⁄erent from the closed
economy case, however, we now assume complete markets ￿ households have access to a
full set of Arrow-Debreu securities. Using a sequential formulation (see e.g. Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2000)), let Q(st+1 j st) denote the price of one unit of Home currency delivered in
period t + 1 contingent on the state of nature at t + 1 being st+1. With complete markets,
Q(st+1 j st) is the same for all individuals. Let Bt(st+1;j) denote the claim to Bt(st+1;j)
units of Home currency at time t + 1 in the state of nature st+1, that household j buys at
time t and brings into time t + 1. B￿
t (st;j) and Q￿(st+1 j st) are similarly de￿ned in terms
of units of Foreign currency.








t (st+1;j)Q￿(st+1 j st) ￿ Mt￿1(j)
+Bt￿1(st;j) + EtB￿
t￿1(st;j) + Wt‘t(j) + Pt(j) ￿ NETTt(j) ￿ PtCt(j) (B.17)
In the expression above, Et denotes the nominal exchange rate (de￿ned as Home currency
per unit of Foreign currency). The utility function and the budget constraint of the Foreign
representative household is similarly de￿ned.
Home household j maximizes utility subject to (B.17). The ￿rst order conditions with
respect to Ct(j), Mt(j) and ‘t(j) are identical to (A.16), (A.20) and (A.21) above. Without
loss of generality, we focus only on Home-currency securities. The ￿rst order conditions
with respect to each Arrow-Debreu security yield:






where Pr(st+1 j st) denotes the probability of state st+1 at time t + 1 conditional on the
realization of state st at t. Similar results hold for the representative Foreign household.
Namely, the ￿rst order conditions with respect to the Arrow-Debreu securities yield:
Et+1
Et




































xiThe rate of growth of marginal utility is equal to the rate of real depreciation (the rate of
growth of the real exchange rate). Using the de￿nitions ￿ = PC and ￿￿ = P￿C￿, we can

















t = constant ￿ Et￿￿
t (B.23)
In a symmetric world, Home and Foreign consumption are ex ante identical, hence the
constant in the above expression is equal to one. The equilibrium exchange rate is therefore










Using the equilibrium discount factor, it is easy to price one period nominal bonds that
are traded internationally. In the case of bonds denominated in domestic currency, yielding
the nominal interest rate i, we have:
￿Dt + ￿ (1 + it)EtDt+1 = 0 (B.26)
which is identical to (A.19). In the case of bonds denominated in Foreign currency, and
yielding i￿ we have
￿DtEt + ￿ (1 + i￿
t)EtDt+1Et+1 = 0 (B.27)
which can also be written as:
1
Ct











Firms The production functions in the two countries are linear in labor:
Yt(h) = Zt‘t(h) Y ￿
t (f) = Z￿
t ‘￿
t(f) (B.29)
where Zt and Z￿
t are two country-speci￿c productivity processes. Note that the resource

















































































Similarly we can obtain total demand for Foreign variety f.
International price setting Recalling that the Home marginal cost is given by
(A.24) as before, and accounting for the downward-sloping demand for its products (B.34),



















































In the absence of nominal rigidities, Home ￿rms set prices to maximize Pt(h) with respect







Both prices are equal to the marginal cost augmented by a constant markup ￿=(￿ ￿ 1). The
law of one price holds, as the same good h sells at the same price in both markets when
expressed in terms of the same currency.
With nominal rigidities, ￿rms set the price(s) at which they sell their good in the Home
and Foreign countries at time t before observing the realization of the macroeconomic shocks
￿ based on available information at time t ￿ 1 ￿ by maximizing Et￿1 (Qt￿1;tPt(h)). The

















This expression can be further simpli￿ed by recalling that Qt￿1;t = ￿Pt￿1Ct￿1=PtCt, CH;t =
PtCt=2PH;t, and observing that all prices pt(h) are symmetric, thus pt(h) = PH;t:




xiiiThe Foreign-currency price p￿
t(h) can be set in two di⁄erent ways, depending on the
speci￿c currency in which Home exports are priced. If exports are priced and invoiced
in domestic (producer￿ s) currency, ￿rm h maximizes Et￿1 (Qt￿1;tPt(h)) with respect to
Etp￿
































































, and observing that
all prices Etp￿


















































The previous expression implies that Foreign-currency prices P￿
H;t move one-to-one with the
nominal exchange rate, leaving the export price EtP￿
H;t unchanged when expressed in Home
currency (in other words, there is full exchange rate pass-through).
If the export price is set instead in Foreign currency, ￿rm h maximizes expected dis-
counted pro￿ts Et￿1 (Qt￿1;tPt(h)) with respect to p￿















































































According to this expression, Home export prices expressed in Foreign currency do not move
when the exchange rate changes (zero pass-through). Similar results hold for Foreign ￿rms.
xivResource constraints and policy The resource constraint for the Home output is:





































which can be written synthetically as:
















The variable ￿t is an index of international spillovers, re￿ ecting the macroeconomic impact























As before, each government sets the national money stance by controlling the domestic
nominal interest rate, and ￿nances net transfers with seigniorage revenue.
A digression on an alternative speci￿cation of our model It is worth noting
that our model would yield exactly the same equilibrium allocation if, instead of assuming
complete markets, we assume that only one period nominal bonds are traded internationally,
and net foreign wealth is initially zero. To see this, rewrite the budget constraints (B.17)
including only international bonds, B and B￿, denominated in either domestic or foreign














t (j￿)dj￿ = 0: (B.49)
Aggregating the budget constraint across j-agents, and accounting for the government bud-
get constraint (A.36), we would then obtain :














and aggregate pro￿ts are:















t ￿ Wt‘t (B.52)
xvUnder the assumption that at time t = 0 the net asset position of the country is zero,
or B0 ￿ E0B￿
0 = 0, it can be shown that, for all t ￿ 0, the equilibrium conditions are solved
by the allocation:
Bt = EtB￿




implying that nominal spending is equalized between the two countries when expressed in
terms of the same currency. The nominal exchange rate moves to o⁄set any imbalances in
relative nominal spending, and since the latter is equal to the ratio of the monetary stances,







This is exactly the same solution for the exchange rate that we derived in our model above.
Macroeconomic synthesis of the two-country model To summarize: given the
exogenous variables Zt, Z￿
t , ￿t, ￿￿
t and the prices PH;t, PF;t, P￿
H;t, P￿
F;t, the macroeconomics
of the two-country model is described by the system of 13 equations in 13 endogenous
variables Et, Pt, P￿
t , Ct, C￿
t , ￿t, ￿￿
t, ‘t, ‘￿



































































The model is closed by providing endogenous expressions for the four prices. In the



































































































































































Transmission of productivity and monetary shocks Consider the implications
of the price-setting scenarios above. Absent nominal rigidities, there is full employment in





= ￿ ‘ (B.61)
In the presence of nominal rigidities, instead, full employment holds only on average:
Et￿1 (‘t) = Et￿1 (‘￿
t) = ￿ ‘ (B.62)





































Incidentally, note that if Home and Foreign consumption baskets had di⁄erent elasticities
of substitution, ￿ 6= ￿
￿, or national residents had di⁄erent sensitivities to labor e⁄ort,








In each country, the labor gap is a function of domestic shocks only. This implies that
monetary policies have no spillovers on output abroad. A depreciation of Et deteriorates
the terms of trade at Home and improves them abroad. Consumption moves symmetrically














































































xviiUnder a scenario of low pass-through worldwide, monetary policies in one country a⁄ect
output and employment overseas. A depreciation of Et now increases Home exporters￿
sales revenue and reduces Foreign exporters￿sales revenue, without e⁄ects on consumer
prices. Thus, a depreciation of Et has now a positive impact on ￿t and negative on ￿￿
t.
Consumption changes asymmetrically across countries, implying a negative, ￿ beggar-thy-




















Finally, if world exports are all invoiced in the Home currency, macroeconomic shocks








































































Now a depreciation of E has no macroeconomic e⁄ects in the Home country: output, con-
sumption, and terms of trade are all insulated from external shocks. The implications for
the Foreign economy are more complex. On the one hand, a depreciation of E lowers import
prices in the Foreign country and improves ￿￿ (this e⁄ect is captured by the numerator of
(B.73)). On the other hand, the same depreciation reduces sales revenue of Foreign exporters
and lowers ￿￿ (an e⁄ect captured by the denominator of (B.73)). Which e⁄ect prevails de-







t ). Yet, when evaluated in a
non-stochastic equilibrium, the previous expression is zero. Thus, we conclude that a depre-
ciation of E has no ￿rst-order e⁄ects on ￿￿. Home monetary policy has spillovers for both
Foreign output and consumption: if labor increases by, say, ￿‘￿, consumption increases by
Z￿￿‘￿.
Optimal monetary policy and international policy coordination Using the 2-
country model under PCP, we derive the optimal Home monetary policy under uncertainty
that maximizes the expected utility of the representative Home residents by solving:
max
￿t
Et￿1 (lnCt ￿ ￿‘t) (B.76)
xviiiRecall that Et￿1(‘t) = ￿ ‘, so that the second term in utility is independent of monetary
policy and we need focus on consumption only. In fact, welfare can be written as:










































precisely the same expression we obtained for a closed economy. Home monetary policy
responds one-to one to real shocks, stabilizing Home ￿rms￿markups. Foreign ￿rms￿markups
are una⁄ected by Home shocks, so that an inward-looking policy in the Home country does
not have repercussions abroad. There is no need for coordination, as the optimal monetary
policies in a Nash equilibrium deliver a worldwide ￿rst best (conditional on the presence of
monopolistic distortions).
Under LCP, instead, Home welfare is:


































Home monetary policy now responds to both Home and Foreign shocks, but not to Foreign
monetary shocks. In other words, even in the case of LCP there is no monetary interdepen-




















The system of two equations above is solved by a common policy ￿t = ￿￿
t that responds to
the same average of Home and Foreign shocks while keeping the nominal and real exchange
rate constant.
When world exports are priced in Home currency, Home welfare is still equal to (B.79),


















































In a Nash equilibrium, the country that issues the vehicle currency (Home) optimally re-
sponds to shocks hitting the global economy, while the country that uses the vehicle currency
(Foreign) only needs to stabilize domestic prices and markups.
xix